


87-1296

No.



IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

IN RE EXXON CORPORATION, THE BF GOODRICH COMPANY,
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION, MONSANTO COMPANY,
AND TENNECO RESINS, INC.,
Petitioners.

**PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY**


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February 1988

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Supreme Court of New Jersey violated this Court's mandate in *Exxon Corp. v. Hunt*, 475 U.S. 355 (1986), by denying petitioners a refund of state taxes, which this Court had held were expressly preempted by a federal statute, on the grounds that (1) the statute preempted only expenditures and not, as this Court had held, the exaction of taxes; (2) preemption became effective almost three years later than the date established by Congress; (3) policies of a subsequent Congress disfavored preemption; and (4) principles of equity warranted denial of petitioners' claim.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

The petitioners are named in the caption.*

The following respondents were defendants-respondents in the court below: Robert Hunt, Administrator of New Jersey Spill Compensation Fund; Clifford A. Goldman, Treasurer of the State of New Jersey; Sidney Glaser, Director of the Division of Taxation; Jerry F. English, Commissioner of Environmental Protection; and the State of New Jersey.

The following respondents are those Justices of the Supreme Court of New Jersey who participated in the decision below: Robert L. Clifford, Alan B. Handler, Stewart G. Pollock, and Gary S. Stein. Additional respondents are Judges Michael P. King and Sylvia B. Pressler of the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division, who sat by special designation.

* Tenneco Resins, Inc., was formerly Tenneco Chemicals, Inc. Pursuant to Rule 28.1, all parent companies, subsidiaries (except wholly owned) and affiliates of petitioners are listed in the appendix at pages 64a-80a.

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Petitioners.

**PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY**

Exxon Corporation, The BF Goodrich Company, Union Carbide Corporation, Monsanto Company, and Tenneco Resins, Inc., petition for a writ of mandamus directing the Supreme Court of New Jersey to comply with the mandate issued by this Court in *Exxon Corp. v. Hunt*, 475 U.S. 355 (1986).

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Supreme Court of New Jersey (App., *infra*, 1a-26a) is not yet reported. The recommendation of the Tax Court of New Jersey (App., *infra*, 27a-60a) is not reported.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).

STATUTORY PROVISION INVOLVED

Section 114(c) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c), provided:

Except as provided in this chapter, no person may be required to contribute to any fund, the purpose of which is to pay compensation for claims for any costs of response or damages or claims which may be compensated under this subchapter. Nothing in this section shall preclude any State from using general revenues for such a fund, or from imposing a tax or fee upon any person or upon any substance in order to finance the purchase or prepositioning of hazardous substance response equipment or other preparations for the response to a release of hazardous substances which affects such State.

STATEMENT

This petition arises out of a suit brought by petitioners in 1981 in the Tax Court of New Jersey seeking a declaratory judgment and a refund of taxes imposed under the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act (Spill Act), N.J. Stat. §§ 58:10-23.11, *et seq.* Petitioners complained that the taxes which created a Spill Fund under the Act were preempted by Section 114(c) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c). The Tax Court ruled against petitioners, holding that CERCLA did not preempt a state tax used to create funds to pay for hazardous waste cleanup eligible for CERCLA compensation, but instead merely prevented taxes for funds to pay cleanup expenses that were actually paid by the "Superfund" established by CERCLA. Its decision was affirmed both by the Appellate Division of the Superior Court and the Supreme Court of New Jersey.¹

¹ 97 N.J. 526, 481 A.2d 271 (No. 84-978 J.S. App. 15a-36a); 190 N.J. Super. 131 (No. 84-978 J.S. App. 37a-46a); 4 N.J. Tax 294 (No. 84-978 J.S. App. 47a-78a).

This Court reversed the New Jersey courts' construction of CERCLA. *Exxon Corp. v. Hunt*, 475 U.S. 355 (1986). Recognizing that "[t]his is an express preemption case," this Court agreed with petitioners that "the New Jersey courts have violated the plain meaning of the statute." *Id.* at 362, 370. Taxation is forbidden, the Court concluded, to support "state funds that covered Superfund-eligible expenses," whether or not those expenses were actually paid by Superfund. *Id.* at 375.

The Court found that two types of claims eligible for compensation under the Spill Act—governmental cleanup of hazardous waste sites and reimbursement of third parties for cleanup costs—were also compensable under CERCLA.² Accordingly, it ruled that the New Jersey tax was preempted to the extent its purpose was to pay for these expenses, rejecting the dissent's invitation to uphold the entire tax on the basis of the Spill Fund's other non-preempted purposes. *Id.* The Court specifically rejected New Jersey's argument that its tax was lawful because the expenditures actually made from the Spill Fund were not directed toward CERCLA-eligible purposes:

New Jersey argues, finally, that after the enactment of CERCLA, * * * all Spill Fund expenditures * * * [have been] for nonpre-empted purposes. *To the extent that the Spill Act permits taxation to support pre-empted expenditures, however, it cannot stand.*

475 U.S. at 376 (emphasis added).³

² The Court held that these purposes "are within the scope of CERCLA, except to the extent that they are intended to provide the 10% state share of remedial costs." 475 U.S. at 375-76.

³ The state's argument also was erroneous as a factual matter. At the time of this Court's decision, only a *de minimis* proportion of Spill Fund expenditures had been devoted to non-preempted purposes. See Appellants' opening brief in *Exxon Corp. v. Hunt*, No. 84-978, at 22-23 n.24, 25 n.26. This pattern continued following this Court's decision—the record before the Tax Court on remand showed that 89% of the \$49.5 million spent by New Jersey on

Thus making it clear that the appropriate inquiry was the purpose of the tax, not the nature of the subsequent expenditures, this Court held that at least a portion of the New Jersey tax was preempted. It remanded the case for a determination whether any portion of the tax could be saved: the lower court was directed to consider "whether, or to what extent, the nonpre-empted provisions of the statute are severable from the pre-empted provisions." 475 U.S. at 376; *see App., infra*, 62a-63a.

On remand from this Court, the New Jersey Supreme Court sent the matter back to the Tax Court to develop a record and to make recommended findings. *App., infra*, 61a. The Tax Court thereupon embraced the very premise which this Court had rejected—that "it was not the collection of the Spill Act tax that the [United States Supreme] Court found to be improper but rather certain expenditures made from the fund." *Id.* at 39a.⁴ The Tax Court therefore ruled that petitioners would be entitled to a refund only if the State had expended monies from the Spill Fund for CERCLA purposes. Moreover, even though Section 114(c) was made effective on CERCLA's December 11, 1980 enactment, the Tax Court held that

cleanup was devoted to sites eligible for Superfund compensation. *See Appendix in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Schedule IV.*

⁴ Attributing language to this Court that is nowhere to be found in *Exxon v. Hunt*, the Tax Court further stated:

The United States Supreme Court * * * held that, "the State was entitled to *collect taxes*," * * * but that, "the State was not permitted to *spend* that money for any of the types of projects which EPA intended to finance," with superfund. Quite simply put, it was the nature of certain expenditures and not the tax collected to fund *all* the expenditures * * * that the Court found to be objectionable.

App., infra, 49a (emphasis and quotation marks in original). *See also id.* at 58a ("the harm which plaintiffs * * * allegedly suffered is the improper expenditure of legal tax monies").

state expenditures were preempted only if made after the June 16, 1982 promulgation of the National Contingency Plan (NCP) or, where applicable, the September 8, 1983 promulgation of the National Priority List (NPL). *Id.* at 59a.

Finally, the Tax Court held that "the [State] Legislature should be permitted a reasonable period of time to reimburse the spill fund for the amount of preempted expenditures made." App., *infra*, 56a. Such reimbursement, the Tax Court concluded, "will make the plaintiffs whole because the constitutional infirmity and plaintiffs' financial harm resulted from the improper expenditure of spill fund revenues and not the collection of the tax per se." *Id.* at 56a-57a (emphasis in original).

The New Jersey Supreme Court adopted the "thoughtful and practical" (App., *infra*, 20a) recommendations of the Tax Court. Thus, it too held that Section 114(c) of CERCLA preempted only expenditures from the Spill Fund and not the collection of taxes. App., *infra*, 7a-12a, 20a, 25a-26a.⁵ The court therefore did not determine whether there were any portions of the tax sustained by non-preempted purposes that could be severed from those that this Court had held were preempted. Instead, focusing on expenditures instead of taxes, the state Supreme Court concluded that the provisions of the Spill Act allowing "preempted" expenditures could be severed from those that allowed other expenditures. *Id.* at 7a-12a.

The New Jersey Supreme Court also held, like the Tax Court, that preemption did not begin on the effective date of Section 114(c), but instead on the dates related to publication of the NCP and NPL. *Id.* at 15a-

⁵ For example, the Court stated that the "tax rate" was one of the "non-preempted portions of the Spill Act." App., *infra*, 8a. See also *id.* at 20a (discussing "pre-empted expenditures").

16a.⁶ It thereby delayed preemption for approximately three out of the five years that CERCLA initially was in effect, bringing about the very "overtaxation" of industry that this Court concluded Congress intended to prohibit through Section 114(c). 475 U.S. at 372.

Invoking its purported equitable discretion, the state Supreme Court said that it would treat a tax refund to petitioners as a "remedy of last resort." App., *infra*, at 25a. Thus, the court held that no refund would be made if the Legislature "reimburse[s] the Spill Fund for the amount of expenditures found to be pre-empted."⁷ *Id.* at 25a. This followed from the Court's view that it is the Spill Fund—rather than petitioners—that the remedy should "make * * * whole." *Id.* at 26a. Once the Legislature reimburses the Fund by transferring revenues from other accounts, the Fund will be "whole" and petitioners will be denied any refunds.⁸

In reaching this result, the Court relied on neither an analysis of CERCLA nor this Court's opinion in *Exxon v. Hunt*. Instead, it stated that it was "obligated to consider" the repeal of Section 114(c), effective October 17, 1986, in the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), App., *infra*, 20a, and

⁶ Indeed, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that even expenditures made by New Jersey after promulgation of the NCP and NPL were not preempted so long as the decision to commit the funds was made prior to promulgation of the NCP or NPL. *Id.* at 19a.

⁷ The Tax Court had recommended that if, following reimbursement by the Legislature, the amount in the Spill Fund exceeds the \$36 million cap established in the state statute, the excess amount should be refunded to petitioners. App., *infra*, 60a. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that, in view of the repeal of the cap, no refund should be made following reimbursement. *Id.* at 26a; see also *id.* at 10a-11a & n.2.

⁸ The Court again remanded the case to the Tax Court for a hearing on the amount of "preempted" expenditures made from the Spill Fund that the Legislature will be invited to reimburse.

it crafted a remedy which "best implements the intent of Congress in adopting SARA," when it prospectively repealed preemption under CERCLA. *Id.* at 25a. On this reasoning, the state Supreme Court allows New Jersey to retain all of the millions of dollars extracted from petitioners pursuant to a statute that this Court has held is, in substantial measure, expressly preempted by act of Congress.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

From its inception, the focus of this litigation has been on whether Section 114(c) of CERCLA entitled petitioners to a refund of the taxes that they paid to sustain the New Jersey Spill Fund. The state courts initially denied such relief to petitioners by ignoring the plain meaning of Section 114(c), as well as this Court's opinion in *Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Director of Taxation*, 464 U.S. 7 (1983). This Court reversed. The state courts have now ignored the rationale and mandate of this Court's decision and have again denied petitioners relief. Mandamus is warranted in order to bring the state courts into conformity with the mandate issued by this Court.

1. This Court has long held that "a clear case is shown for issuing a writ of mandamus" where the lower court's decision on remand is "based upon a misunderstanding of the mandate, and in practical, though unintentional, disobedience of the command thereof that further proceedings be had in conformity with the opinion of this court." *In re Potts*, 166 U.S. 263, 268 (1897). Similarly, the Court stated in *Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp.*, 434 U.S. 425, 428 (1978) (per curiam), that if a party "is of the view that the [court] to which the case was remanded is failing to carry out the judgment of this Court, its remedy is * * * to file a writ [of] mandamus." See also, e.g., *General Atomic Co. v. Felter*, 436 U.S. 493 (1978) (per curiam); *Will v. United*

States, 389 U.S. 90, 95-96 (1967); *United States v. Haley*, 371 U.S. 18 (1962).

The rule applies to state courts that have departed from this Court's mandate, just as it does to the lower federal courts. In *Deen v. Hickman*, 358 U.S. 57, 58 (1958) (per curiam), for example, the Court granted a motion for leave to file a mandamus petition to direct the Supreme Court of Texas "to conform its decision to [this Court's] mandate." See also *General Atomic Co. v. Felter*, *supra*; *Bucolo v. Adkins*, 424 U.S. 641 (1976) (per curiam).⁹

2. The New Jersey Supreme Court has clearly and substantially departed from the mandate of this Court. The state court erred by holding that (1) only actual expenditures from the Spill Fund, and not the tax, were preempted by Section 114(c) of CERCLA; (2) preemption was effected not on December 11, 1980, as Congress specifically provided, but only by subsequent federal regulatory action taken in 1982 and 1983; (3) the scope of preemption, and any relief to petitioners, should be extremely narrow because SARA subsequently repealed Section 114(c); and (4) the court had equitable discre-

⁹ It also is settled that mandamus is appropriate in these circumstances, even though an appeal or writ of certiorari might also be available:

A litigant who * * * has obtained [a] judgment in this Court after a lengthy process of litigation, involving several layers of courts, should not be required to go through that entire process again to obtain execution of the judgment of this Court.

General Atomic Co. v. Felter, *supra*, 436 U.S. at 497; accord *United States v. United States District Court*, 334 U.S. 258, 264 (1948); *United States v. Haley*, *supra*, 371 U.S. at 20; *Gaines v. Rugg*, 148 U.S. 228, 243 (1893) ("although it might have been admissible to raise the question by a new appeal * * *, we do not consider that such remedy would have been, or would be, fully adequate, or that a writ of mandamus is now improper").

tion to regard a tax refund as a "remedy of last resort" and to devise a remedy that protects the Spill Fund rather than petitioners. The cumulative effect of these errors is to deny petitioners the substantial relief to which they are entitled under this Court's decision and to permit New Jersey "to flout federal law" in precisely the manner disapproved by this Court. 475 U.S. at 376.

a. The premise of the decision below was that Section 114(c), as interpreted by this Court, preempted only certain expenditures from the Spill Fund and not the imposition of the tax. *See, e.g., App., infra*, 25a-26a; pages 4, 5, *supra*. That premise is flatly contrary to the plain language of both Section 114(c) and this Court's decision. Section 114(c) prohibits a state from requiring a person "to contribute to any fund" that has certain purposes; once New Jersey established a fund having those purposes, its administrators' spending decisions could not avoid preemption.

Indeed, this Court rejected the precise argument that the state court accepted on remand. New Jersey argued before this Court that no refund was required because "all Spill Fund expenditures" have been "for nonpreempted purposes." 475 U.S. at 376.¹⁰ This Court disagreed: "To the extent that the Spill Act permits taxation to support pre-empted expenditures, however, it cannot stand." *Id.* Thus, the actual expenditures made from the Spill Fund are irrelevant; the sole question is the purpose for which the tax was imposed, not the manner in which the revenues were later expended.

Further emphasizing that Section 114(c) preempts taxes creating certain kinds of funds, not subsequent spending decisions, this Court held that

[Section 114(c)] is meant to forbid the States to impose taxes to finance certain types of funds. The

¹⁰ *See* page 3 & note 3, *supra*.

issue in this case is whether the New Jersey Spill Fund is, in whole or in part, the type of fund that § 114(c) pre-empts.

475 U.S. at 361; *see also, e.g., id.* at 362 (question is whether Section 114(c) “forbids state taxation of the type the Spill Act imposes”).

Accordingly, this Court reversed the state court “[t]o the extent that the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the Spill Act could constitutionally impose a tax to support expenditures” for purposes covered by CERCLA. *Id.* at 376. On remand, the state court was directed to consider only “whether, or to what extent, the nonpre-empted provisions of the statute are severable from the pre-empted provisions,” not whether certain expenditures could be severed. *Id.* The New Jersey court did not follow this mandate when it upheld the entire tax based solely upon its inquiry regarding expenditures from the Spill Fund.¹¹

b. On December 11, 1980, when CERCLA was enacted, it was clear that two types of claims would ultimately be compensable under the statute—government cleanup of hazardous waste sites and reimbursement to third parties for cleanup costs. It was also clear that further regulatory action by the United States, such as publication of the NCP and NPL, as well as collection of the new federal tax, would be necessary before the fed-

¹¹ If this Court concludes, contrary to our position (pages 13-15, *infra*), that the state court, despite its obduracy, should be given another opportunity to examine the severability issue, it should be instructed that part of the tax may be upheld only if (1) it can reliably be determined that the New Jersey Legislature imposed part of the tax with the sole intent of funding the non-CERCLA purposes of the Spill Act; and (2) under New Jersey law, a court can establish a tax rate to fund solely the non-CERCLA purposes of the Spill Act. If these criteria are met, petitioners would be entitled to a refund proportionate to the difference between the court-established rate and the statutory tax rate.

eral government could actually begin to make payments for such cleanup expenses. Congress did not, however, defer the effectiveness of Section 114(c)'s preemption of state taxes; collection of such taxes was immediately preempted. 42 U.S.C. § 9652(a).¹² Ignoring the effective date of Section 114(c), the New Jersey courts, on remand, ruled that preemption did not "commence" until either the July 16, 1982 promulgation of the NCP or the September 9, 1983 publication of the NPL because those documents specified the sites for which federal monies could actually be obtained. App., *infra*, 15a-18a; *see also id.* at 59a. The result of this substantial delay in effecting preemption is inconsistent with two principles recognized in *Exxon v. Hunt*.

First, it subjects petitioners to the double taxation that Section 114(c) was intended to prevent. *See* 475 U.S. at 372 ("the decision to enact a pre-emption provision resulted in part from Congress' concern about the potentially adverse effects of overtaxation on the competitiveness of the American petrochemical industry") (footnote omitted). Second, in dating preemption only from the promulgation of the NCP and NPL because they clarified the sites eligible for federal compensation, the lower court has resurrected the very construction of CERCLA, as preempting only funds for claims likely to be paid by Superfund, which this Court disapproved in *Exxon v. Hunt*. *See* 475 U.S. at 372 (specifically rejecting New Jersey's argument that it could tax petitioners to pay for its Spill Fund when "the availability of

¹² Prior versions of the bills that preceded the enactment of CERCLA had made the preemption of Section 114(c) effective 180 days after enactment. 2 Library of Congress, S. Committee on The Environment and Public Works, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., A Legislative History of [CERCLA] at 732 (Comm. Print 1983) (H.R. 85); 3 *id.* at 59 (S. 1341). Congress' elimination of the 180-day delay in effecting preemption confirms its intent that preemption was to take effect immediately.

Superfund money is sufficiently low, as a practical matter, that" it was clear such monies would not be expended at certain New Jersey sites).

c. The state court further erred by relying on the subsequent repeal of Section 114(c) in SARA to deny relief to petitioners. In its own words, the state court felt "constrained to fashion a remedy * * * that least offends the congressional purpose in repealing pre-emption." *Id.* at 24a; *see also id.* at 20a-25a.

Again, the state court's reasoning is contrary to *Exxon v. Hunt*. This Court recognized when it rendered decision that CERLA had already expired and that reauthorization legislation was under consideration in Congress, but it concluded that these developments were irrelevant:

Of course, [petitioners'] claims for a refund of taxes paid through September 30, 1985 are unaffected by the expiration of CERCLA or by any changes in the law after that date.

475 U.S. at 362 n.6 (emphasis added); *see generally, e.g., Greene v. United States*, 376 U.S. 149, 160 (1964). The state court ignored this unambiguous directive by relying on the policies that underlay SARA to limit the relief to which petitioners were entitled under CERCLA.

d. The state court further departed from the mandate by invoking its own purported "equitable powers" to "make the Spill Fund whole" and to treat a tax refund to petitioners as "a remedy of last resort." *App., infra*, 24a, 25a. Nothing in this Court's mandate authorized the state court to exercise equitable discretion to limit relief to petitioners. The only question open on remand was the issue of severability, *i.e.*, whether petitioners were entitled to a total refund or whether some portion of the tax imposed on them could be severed and saved. 475 U.S. at 376-377. The state court erred in going beyond the mandate. *See, e.g., Sibbald v. United States*,

37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 488, 492 (1838) (the court below “is bound by the decree [of this Court] * * * [and cannot] give any other or further relief; * * * [n]or intermeddle with it, further than to settle so much as has been remanded”).

Even apart from the terms of the remand, the state court invoked equitable discretion that it did not possess. Once a clear-cut statutory command has been violated, courts do not have equitable discretion to develop a remedy fitting their own conception of the public interest. *See TVA v. Hill*, 437 U.S. 153, 193-195 (1978). Section 114(c) was such a command—it prohibited the states from imposing certain types of taxes. This Court determined that the Spill Act imposed, at least in part, a prohibited tax. The state court was required to enforce the federal statute that preempted the state tax. It could not resort to its own conceptions of public policy or equity to deny the refund to which petitioners were entitled under CERCLA.

3. If the New Jersey Supreme Court had applied this Court’s holding that the exaction of the tax—not the actual expenditures from the fund—was preempted, it would necessarily follow that the single tax was not severable and that the entire tax must therefore fall. Because a single tax sustained the Spill Fund, petitioners argued below that the New Jersey judiciary could not establish a new tax rate by eliminating only a portion of the tax. *See N.J. Const. Art. IV, § 6, para. 1*. The Tax Court agreed:

[T]he Spill Act contains a single tax that cannot be apportioned between its preempted and non-preempted purposes.

* * * *

[H]ad the [United States Supreme Court] found that it was the *collection* of the tax that was improper, this Court should direct repayment of the

taxes to the taxpayers in the same proportion as the taxes were paid.

App., *infra*, 47a, 56a (emphasis in original). It was, of course, precisely the collection of the tax that this Court had found to be preempted under Section 114(c). Accordingly, under the Tax Court's reasoning, petitioners are entitled to a refund of the entire amount of the tax wrongfully collected from them.

The state Supreme Court recognized the correctness of the Tax Court's analysis. It noted, for example, that "a single tax rate was struck by the Legislature" to fund all of the purposes of the statute. App., *infra*, 8a. The state Supreme Court avoided the necessary conclusion that the entire tax must fall only by its erroneous interpretation of this Court's mandate in the respects set forth above, particularly by holding that Section 114(c) preempted only expenditures and not imposition of the tax itself.

The state courts' refusal to refund to petitioners any part of the preempted tax "flout[s] federal law" in precisely the manner that this Court refused to countenance in its decision. 475 U.S. at 376. As this Court concluded, the New Jersey tax cannot be upheld "in its entirety" merely because "valid provisions" were included "within [a] clearly invalid statute[]." *Id.* Notwithstanding this Court's directive, the state courts have upheld the entire Spill Tax, without inquiring into its purposes, solely on the basis that certain expenditures from the Fund were for non-CERCLA purposes.

The unwillingness of the New Jersey courts to conform to federal law mirrors a similar recalcitrance on the part of the state's administrative officials. New Jersey's position at the time that CERCLA was enacted was that the state would ignore the preemptive effect of Section 114(c) and persist in collecting the tax until "a final

determination by the courts is to contrary.”¹³ Of the fifty states, New Jersey was the only one that continued to collect a tax of this nature during the period of preemption.¹⁴ As a result, the balance in the Spill Fund increased tenfold, from \$3 million in 1981 to \$30 million in 1985.¹⁵ There is no justification for permitting the state to continue to “violate[] the plain meaning of the statute” (475 U.S. at 370) by retaining taxes that could not legally be collected under Section 114(c).

The New Jersey courts have twice contravened federal law by denying petitioners a refund of illegally imposed taxes. On remand from this Court, they failed to identify any means of severing part of the tax in a manner consistent with this Court’s mandate, and they clearly indicated that such a severance is not permissible. Under these circumstances, there would be no point to another remand. This Court should instead direct the lower court that petitioners are to be refunded the taxes that they paid under the Spill Act during the period that Section 114(c) was in effect.

¹³ [1 N.J.] St. Tax Rep. (CCH) ¶ 34-180.75 (1981).

¹⁴ See Appellants’ reply brief in *Exxon Corp. v. Hunt*, No. 84-978, at 18-19.

¹⁵ See Appendix in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit B, p. 7 and Exhibit H, p. 7.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of mandamus should be granted. The Supreme Court of New Jersey should be instructed that petitioners are entitled to a refund of taxes paid under the Spill Act during the period that Section 114(c) was in effect.

Respectfully submitted,

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February 1988

APPENDICES

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
September Term 1986

A-158

EXXON CORPORATION, THE BF GOODRICH COMPANY, UNION
CARBIDE CORPORATION, MONSANTO COMPANY and TEN-
NECO CHEMICALS, INC.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ROBERT HUNT, ADMINISTRATOR OF NEW JERSEY SPILL
COMPENSATION FUND; CLIFFORD A. GOLDMAN, TREAS-
URER OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; SIDNEY GLASER,
DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF TAXATION, and THE
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Defendants-Respondents.

EXXON CORPORATION, THE BF GOODRICH COMPANY, UNION
CARBIDE CORPORATION, MONSANTO COMPANY and TEN-
NECO CHEMICALS, INC.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ROBERT HUNT, ADMINISTRATOR OF NEW JERSEY SPILL
COMPENSATION FUND; CLIFFORD A. GOLDMAN, TREAS-
URER OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY; SIDNEY GLASER,
DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF TAXATION; JERRY F.
ENGLISH, COMMISSIONER OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION; and THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Defendants-Respondents.

Argued February 17, 1987—Decided December 2, 1987

On remand from the Supreme Court of the United States, whose opinion is reported at 475 U.S. —, 106 S.Ct. 1103, 89 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986).

John J. Carlin, Jr., argued the cause for appellants (*Mr. Carlin*, attorney; *Mr. Carlin* and *Donald J. Fay*, on the brief).

Mary R. Hamill, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondents (*W. Cary Edwards*, Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney; *Deborah T. Poritz*, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; *Ms. Hamill* and *Nancy B. Stiles*, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).

The opinion of the Court was delivered by STEIN, J.

This case is before us for the second time. Initially, we affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Division upholding the Tax Court's determination that the tax imposed by the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, L.1976, c. 141 (codified as amended at N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11 to -23.24, -23.34) (Spill Act), was not pre-empted by the federal government's adoption of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675) (CERCLA). *Exxon Corp. v. Hunt*, 97 N.J. 526 (1984).

The United States Supreme Court, affirming in part and reversing in part, concluded that the tax levied by the Spill Act was imposed for certain purposes that were pre-empted by CERCLA, as well as for other purposes not pre-empted by CERCLA. *Exxon Corp. v. Hunt*, 475 U.S. 355, 89 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986). Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the matter to this Court to determine "the state law question whether, or to what extent, the non pre-empted provisions of the statute are severable from the pre-empted provisions," *id.* at —, 89 L.Ed.2d at 382, "and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion." *Id.* at —, 89 L.Ed.2d at 383.

We then remanded the matter to the Tax Court to develop a record and to make recommended findings, otherwise retaining jurisdiction. — *N.J.* — (1986). Pursuant to our order, the Tax Court has submitted the following recommended findings:

1. The decision of the United States Supreme Court should not be applied prospectively but should be retroactive to July 16, 1982 with respect to expenditures made on preempted removal purposes and to September 8, 1983 as to preempted remedial expenses.

2. The non-preempted purposes of the Spill Act are severable from the purposes found to be preempted by the United States Supreme Court.

3. Plaintiffs' claims for refunds should not be defeated by reason of their failure to comply with the procedural requirements of *N.J.S.A.* 54:49-14.

4. Following an accounting, (and plenary hearing if necessary) to determine the amount of monies paid for material purchased and services rendered for preempted removal purposes on or after July 16, 1982 and for preempted remedial purposes on or after September 8, 1983 to March 10, 1986, (date of the United States Supreme Court decision), the Legislature should be permitted a reasonable period of time to reimburse the fund for the preempted amounts expended.

(a) If, following such reimbursement, the amount of the fund exceeds the cap established by the Legislature, such excess should be paid to plaintiffs.

(b) Should the required reimbursement not be made, the amount of preempted expenditures should be refunded to plaintiffs.

(c) Such refunds should be made in proportion to the tax paid by each plaintiff to the total tax collected.

5. Defendants should not be enjoined from enforcing payment of the spill fund tax by plaintiffs.

[— *N.J. Tax* —, — (Tax Ct. 1986) slip op. at 38, 39).]

We now modify and, as modified, adopt the recommended findings of the Tax Court.

I

The procedural history and facts pertinent to the pre-emption issue are set forth in the prior opinions of this Court and the United States Supreme Court. They need be restated here only to the extent necessary to frame the unique issue that confronts us in respect of the Supreme Court's remand.

The purpose of the Spill Act, enacted in 1977, was to finance prevention and cleanup of oil spills and hazardous substance discharges because of their adverse effects on the state's environment and economy. *N.J.S.A.* 58:10-23.11a. The Act levied an excise tax on major chemical and petroleum facilities within the state, and the proceeds of the tax have been deposited into a permanent fund (Spill Fund) to implement the legislative goals. *N.J.S.A.* 58:10-23.11h. The Spill Fund may be expended primarily to clean up discharges of hazardous substances, to compensate third parties from economic losses resulting from such discharges, and for research and administrative costs. *N.J.S.A.* 58:10-23.11o. Tax collections during Spill Fund fiscal years from 1978 through 1985 averaged slightly less than 10 million dollars annually.

Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980, providing for the establishment over a five-year period of a 1.6 billion dollar trust fund, commonly known as Superfund. 87.5% of Superfund was raised primarily by federal excise taxes on petroleum and chemicals,¹ and the balance by

¹ The federal excise tax on petroleum is currently at the rate of 0.79 cent a barrel and on chemicals at rates ranging from 0.22 cent

appropriations from general revenues. Superfund's resources may be expended for two primary purposes: the first, "governmental response," encompasses both "removals" of released hazardous substances in the nature of a "short term" cleanup, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(23), and "remedial action," to achieve a "permanent remedy" for released hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(24). Secondly, Superfund may pay claims, consisting either of reimbursement to private parties for hazardous substance cleanup costs consistent with the national contingency plan, or reimbursement to the federal or a state government to compensate for damages to natural resources. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9611(a)(2)-(3). Unlike Spill Fund, Superfund resources cannot be used to clean up oil spills or to compensate third parties for economic losses caused by hazardous substance discharges.

The pre-emption issue that was resolved by the Supreme Court's decision concerned the proper interpretation of § 114(c) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9614(c). That section, since repealed in its entirety by § 14(a) of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1652 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 9614(c)), provided as follows:

Except as provided in this chapter, no person may be required to contribute to any fund, the purpose of which is to pay compensation for claims for any costs of response or damages or claims which may be compensated under this subchapter. Nothing in this section shall preclude any State from using general revenues for such a fund, or from imposing

to \$4.87 per ton. 26 U.S.C.A. § 4611. Under the Spill Act, as originally enacted, the basic tax rate was .01 cent per barrel on petroleum products, and on non-petroleum products the greater of .01 cent per barrel or .4% of fair market value. L. 1976, c. 141, § 9. As amended by L. 1986, c. 143, § 2, the tax rate is .0125 cent per barrel on petroleum products, and on nonpetroleum products the greater of .0125 cent per barrel or 1% of fair market value. N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11h.

a tax or fee upon any person or upon any substance in order to finance the purchase or prepositioning of hazardous substance response equipment or other preparations for the response to a release of hazardous substances which affects such State.

The New Jersey Attorney General's contention was that the pre-emption language should be construed to prohibit only payments to a fund to be used for purposes that are actually compensated by Superfund. The Supreme Court rejected that construction and concluded that § 114(c) pre-empted "any fund intended, in whole or in part, to pay for the same types of expenses that may be paid by Superfund," 475 *U.S.* at —, 89 *L.Ed.2d* at 379, whether or not Superfund actually paid such expenses.

With respect to the parameters of pre-emption the Court's opinion implicitly acknowledged that CERCLA itself does not set forth criteria for determining which removal and remedial expenses and which natural resource claims "may be compensated" by Superfund. Accordingly, since such criteria are set forth in the National Contingency Plan (NCP) required by CERCLA to be revised to reflect its provisions, 42 *U.S.C.A.* § 9605(8) (B), the Court held that "the NCP provides the appropriate measure of whether a given expenditure constitutes 'costs of response or damages or claims which may be compensated' by Superfund." 475 *U.S.* at —, 89 *L.Ed.2d* at 382.

The Court conceded that CERCLA did not pre-empt expenditures authorized by the Spill Act for the following purposes: to compensate third parties for damage resulting from hazardous substance discharges; to pay personnel and equipment costs; to administer the fund itself; and to conduct research. *Id.* at —, 89 *L.Ed.2d* at 382. In addition, the Court specifically excluded the required State contribution to the cost of remedial ac-

tions, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(c)(3)(C), from those costs that “may be compensated” by Superfund.

The Court concluded that the Spill Act was pre-empted by § 114(c) of CERCLA to the extent that the Act authorized expenditures, beyond the mandatory state share, “for remedial costs for sites on the National Priority List, or for removal costs that are eligible for Superfund compensation under the terms of the NCP.” 475 U.S. at —, 89 L.Ed.2d at 382.

II

Recommendations of the Tax Court

No testimony was elicited in the course of the remand proceedings before the Tax Court. As a result, the record on remand consists solely of affidavits and exhibits submitted by the parties in support of various motions filed with the Court.

(a) *Severability*

We are in full accord with the Tax Court’s conclusion that the purposes of the Spill Act held to be pre-empted may be severed from the remainder of the statute without impairing its validity.

The critical standard for determining issues of severability is the presumed intent of the Legislature. “That intent must be determined on the basis of whether the objectionable feature of the statute can be excised without substantial impairment of the principal objects of the statute.” *Affiliated Distillers Brands Corp. v. Sills*, 60 N.J. 342, 345 (1972); accord *New Jersey Chapter, Am. Inst. of Planners v. New Jersey State Bd. of Prof. Planners*, 48 N.J. 581, 593, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 8, 19 L.Ed.2d 8 (1967); *Lane Distributors, Inc. v. Tilton*, 7 N.J. 349, 369-70 (1951); 2 *Sutherland, Statutory Construction* § 44.03 (C. Sands 4th ed. 1986) at 483. As we explained in *State v. Lanza*, 27 N.J. 516 (1958),

[A]n unconstitutional provision in a statute does not affect the validity of a separate article or clause of the enactment, if otherwise valid, unless the two are so intimately connected and mutually dependent as reasonably to sustain the hypothesis that the Legislature would not have adopted the one without the other. Where the principal object of the statute is constitutional, and the objectionable provision can be excised without substantial impairment of the general purpose, the statute is operative except insofar as it may contravene fundamental law. [*Id.* at 528.]

In this unusual setting, the inquiry is whether the Legislature would have intended the nonpre-empted portions of the Spill Act, including the tax rate, to remain in effect notwithstanding the determination that significant statutory purposes were pre-empted by CERCLA *for a limited period*. (See discussion as to the period of pre-emption, *infra* at — (slip op. at 14-23)). Plaintiffs argued in the Tax Court and before us that severability is inappropriate where, as here, a single tax rate was struck by the Legislature to fund both pre-empted and nonpre-empted purposes. We are not persuaded, however, that the valid purposes of a taxing statute are not severable from the invalid ones simply because all of the statutory objectives are financed by the same tax. Rather, the entire statutory scheme must be analyzed in order to ascertain the probable intent of the Legislature as to severability. The guiding principle was succinctly stated by Judge Gibbons in *Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey*, 774 F.2d 587, 597 (3d Cir. 1985): “This [severability] is largely a question of whether the statute will continue to make sense after the challenged portion is excised.”

We observe initially that the Spill Act contains a standard severability clause. N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11w. However, the inclusion or exclusion of such a clause does

not ordinarily resolve the issue. See *State v. Lanza*, *supra*, 27 N.J. at 527.

We also note the Legislature's comprehensive objectives in passing the Spill Act:

The Legislature finds and declares that the discharge of petroleum products and other hazardous substances within or outside the jurisdiction of this State constitutes a threat to the economy and environment of this State. The Legislature intends by the passage of this act to exercise the powers of this State to control the transfer and storage of hazardous substances and to provide liability for damage sustained within this State as a result of any discharge of said substances, by requiring the prompt containment and removal of such pollution and substances, and to provide a fund for swift and adequate compensation to resort businesses and other persons damaged by such discharge. [N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11a.]

To implement these wide-ranging goals, the Act authorizes the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) to clean up hazardous discharges either by using the resources of the Spill Fund or by directing the discharger to perform the work at its own expense. N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11f. The fund also can be used to reimburse innocent third parties for cleanup and removal costs incurred by them, and to pay direct and indirect damages sustained because of hazardous substance discharges. N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g. The Act imposes joint and several liability on dischargers of hazardous substances, without regard to fault, for all cleanup and removal costs, N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g, and authorizes the imposition of treble damages on a discharger who fails to comply with a directive to clean up a hazardous-substance discharge. N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11f-a. The Spill Fund's authorized uses were summarized in the Supreme Court's opinion:

As we have explained above, the Spill Fund may be used for six purposes: (1) to finance governmental cleanup of hazardous waste sites; (2) to reimburse third parties for cleanup costs; (3) to compensate third parties for damage resulting from hazardous substance discharges; (4) to pay personnel and equipment costs; (5) to administer the fund itself; and (6) to conduct research. [475 U.S. at —, 89 *L.Ed.2d* at 382.]

It is also significant that the Legislature, when it adopted the Spill Act, knew that federal funding for hazardous waste cleanup was possible and that such funding might warrant modification of the authorized purposes of the Spill Act. Section 27 of the Act provides:

If the United States Congress enacts legislation providing compensation for the discharge of petroleum and hazardous products, the commissioner shall determine to what degree that legislation provides the needed protection for our citizens, businesses and environment and shall make the appropriate recommendations to the Legislature for amendments to this act. [L. 1976, c.141, § 27 (codified at N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11z).]

Also pertinent to the question of severability is the provision in the Spill Act as originally enacted, L.1976, c.141, § 9, suspending the collection of taxes whenever the Spill Fund attains certain prescribed levels.² Al-

² In its original form, N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11h provided, in part:

b. * * * In each fiscal year following any year in which the balance of the fund equals or exceeds \$50,000,000.00, no tax shall be levied unless (1) the current balance in the fund is less than \$40,000,000.00 or (2) pending claims against the fund exceed 50% of the existing balance of the fund. The provisions of the foregoing notwithstanding, should claims paid from or pending against the fund not exceed \$5,000,000.00 within 3 years after the tax is first levied, the tax shall be \$0.01 per barrel transferred or 0.4% of the fair market value

though these tax-suspension provisions of the Act were repealed as of February 1, 1987, *L.1986, c.143, § 2* (codified at *N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11h-b*), they were in effect during the entire period of pre-emption. Accordingly, the Spill Act had a self-correcting mechanism that would suspend tax collections when existing funds were adequate to discharge the statutory objectives. These provisions appear to reflect the Legislature's assumption that if the demands on the Spill Fund were less expansive than originally contemplated, the impact of the prescribed tax rate on the oil and chemical industry would be alleviated by the tax-suspension provisions built into the Act. Although undoubtedly not adopted in anticipation of a holding that certain statutory objectives were pre-empted by CERCLA, the presence of the tax-suspension mechanism persuasively suggests that the tax-rate provisions of the Act are not inconsistent with a determination that the nonpre-empted purposes of the Spill Act are severable from the pre-empted purposes during the limited period of pre-emption.

We are also informed by the uncontroverted affidavit of Michael E. Catania, Deputy Commissioner of the DEP, filed with the Tax Court in support of the State's motion seeking severability and prospective application of the Supreme Court's decision, that the Spill Fund will require approximately 340 million dollars during the five fiscal years beginning with 1987 to pay for "nonpre-empted" type expenditures. Of this amount, 200 million dollars is projected as the cleanup cost for sites ineligible

of the product, as the case may be, until the balance in the fund equals or exceeds \$36,000,000.00, and thereafter shall not be levied unless: (1) the current balance in the fund is less than \$30,000,000.00 or (2) pending claims against the fund exceed 50% of the existing balance of the fund. In the event of either such occurrence and upon certification thereof by the State Treasurer, the director shall within 10 days of the date of such certification levy the excise tax, which shall take effect on the first day of the month following such levy. * * *

for Superfund reimbursement and 140 million dollars as the anticipated State share of cleanup costs at Superfund-eligible sites. The affidavit also identified anticipated increases in administrative costs and in the cost of reimbursement of third-party claims. The affidavit states that the projected needs of the Spill Fund for nonpre-empted purposes are substantially higher than the anticipated revenue from the then current tax rate.

As forecast by the Catania affidavit, the Legislature has recently recognized the enhanced needs of the Spill Fund by increasing the tax rate, and broadening the tax base by redefining "major facility" to include a greater number of oil and chemical companies. *L. 1986, c. 143, § 2* (codified at *N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11h*). The Legislature's commitment of additional resources to the Spill Fund, after the Supreme Court's pre-emption decision, demonstrates plainly that the Legislature's assumption in 1986 was that the Spill Act remained in effect, notwithstanding the Court's conclusion that a portion of the act's objectives had been pre-empted for a limited period.³

Accordingly, we are convinced on the basis of the overall structure of the Spill Act, its comprehensive purpose to facilitate the statewide cleanup of hazardous-substance discharges, and the continuing commitment of the Legislature to provide adequate resources for the Spill Fund that severability of the nonpre-empted provision of the Spill Fund, during the limited period of pre-emption, is manifestly consistent with the legislative intent. The Spill Act "makes sense," *Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, supra*, 774 F.2d at 597, with or without the pre-empted purposes.

³ *L. 1986, c. 143* was enacted after Congress adopted the Superfund Amendments & Reauthorization Act of 1986, which repealed the pre-emption provision in CERCLA. 42 *U.S.C.A.* § 9614(c). Nevertheless, it is self-evident that the Legislature assumed that the Supreme Court's decision did not invalidate the Spill Act in its entirety.

(b) *Period and Scope of Pre-emption*

The conclusion that the pre-empted purposes of the Spill Act are severable from the nonpre-empted provisions requires that we determine the period and scope of pre-emption and, based on that determination, the appropriate relief. The positions of the parties conflict sharply. The State argues that the Supreme Court's decision should be given only prospective application, with the result that the period of pre-emption would begin on March 10, 1986 (the date of the Court's decision), and would end on October 17, 1986, the effective date of SARA. If its position on prospectivity is rejected, the State supports the Tax Court's determination that promulgation of the NCP and the NPL mark the commencement period for pre-emption of removal and remedial actions respectively, but the State argues that the pre-emption period should end on September 30, 1985, the date on which CERCLA's taxing authority expired.

Plaintiff's position is that the effective date of the Supreme Court's holding that the Spill Act was partially pre-empted by CERCLA must be December 11, 1980, the date of CERCLA's enactment. Plaintiffs point to section 302(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9652(a), which states that "unless otherwise provided, all provisions of [CERCLA] shall be effective on December 11, 1980." Moreover, plaintiffs argue that the Supreme Court's references to the NCP and NPL were intended solely to provide a frame of reference for determining *whether* the Spill Act established a fund that was devoted to pre-empted purposes, but were not intended to imply that the effective date of pre-emption depended on promulgation of the NCP and NPL. Plaintiffs further contend that on CERCLA's enactment New Jersey had "adequate guidance" to know what sites would be eligible for Superfund reimbursement and "could have amended the Spill Act so as not to violate Section 114(c)."

We are in full accord with the Tax Court's conclusion that the Supreme Court's decision in this case should not be restricted to prospective application. Although the Supreme Court's opinion is silent on the issue of retrospective application, the remand to this Court to determine severability and "for further proceedings" carries with it the implicit direction that we determine the relief appropriate to the holding that the Spill Act is partially pre-empted. If the Court conceived that its decision might apply only prospectively, which would significantly affect the remedy we must fashion, it is reasonable to assume that the opinion would at least have adverted to that possibility. See *Lemon v. Kurzman*, 411 U.S. 192, 198, 199, 30 L.Ed.2d 151, 160 (1973) (*Lemon II*) (holding that there are no absolute principles available to determine whether a given constitutional ruling should be applied retroactively and that equitable principles and the totality of circumstances should guide such determinations); accord *Coons v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.*, 96 N.J. 419 (1984) (*Coons II*).

Moreover, we agree with the Tax Court that an indispensable prerequisite to prospectivity is not present in this case, since the Supreme Court's opinion did not "establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied * * * or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed * * *." *Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson*, 404 U.S. 97, 106, 30 L.Ed.2d 296, 306 (1971) (citations omitted). Here, the Supreme Court relied upon a settled legal principle—the preeminence of federal legislation under the supremacy clause, article VI, clause 2 of the United States Constitution—and applied it by construing section 114(c) of CERCLA as pre-empting certain provisions of the Spill Act. No "clear past precedent" was overruled nor could the question of statutory interpretation fairly be considered an "issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly fore-

shadowed," as that phrase was used in *Chevron*. The purpose of the *Chevron* test is the avoidance of prejudice arising from judicial decisions that interested parties could not fairly have anticipated. In this case the issue of statutory interpretation was susceptible to either of two resolutions, one advanced by the State and the other advanced by plaintiffs. The Court's holding that CERCLA partially pre-empted the Spill Act was not sufficiently unpredictable to satisfy this aspect of the *Chevron* criteria. Accordingly, we conclude that an exclusively prospective application of the Court's decision is inappropriate under these circumstances.

We also agree with the Tax Court's conclusion that the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) promulgation of the NCP and the NPL marked the critical dates on which pre-emption of remedial and removal expenditures, respectively, shall be deemed to have commenced. The NCP sets forth detailed criteria for determining whether removal actions may be financed by Superfund, imposes limits on the cost and duration of most removal actions, and prescribes the conditions under which such limits may be exceeded. 40 *C.F.R.* § 300.65 (b) (2) and (3) (1987). In addition, the NCP limits Superfund-financed remedial actions to sites listed on the NPL, 40 *C.F.R.* § 300.68(a) (1987), which was initially promulgated in September 1983 and thereafter amended and supplemented to include additional sites.

Plaintiffs, arguing that CERCLA's effective date of December 11, 1980, is necessarily the date of pre-emption, contend that New Jersey could have anticipated the impact of the NCP and NLP. Plaintiffs assert that two of New Jersey's worst sites had qualified prior to May 1981 for an unspecified amount of funding under the Clean Water Act, 33 *U.S.C.A.* § 1251-1376; the implication is that qualification of such sites for Superfund reimbursement was therefore inevitable. Plaintiffs also observe that four New Jersey sites had qualified in 1981 to

receive money from Superfund for study and design work, and that a substantial number of New Jersey sites received high rankings on a list of EPA Region II sites designated as "candidates" for remedial funding under Superfund.

In response, the affidavit of defendant Robert E. Hunt, Administrator of Spill Fund from 1978 to 1986, described the difficulty experienced by DEP officials in 1981 and 1982 because "the scope of the federal program had not been defined and Superfund financing decisions appeared to be made by EPA on a case by case basis." According to Hunt, "there was virtually no money available from Superfund at this time and no real guidance from USEPA as to what activities would eventually be funded."

We need not resolve the conflict whether DEP, from the date of CERCLA's enactment, knew or should have known those hazardous waste sites that would be the inevitable beneficiaries of Superfund's resources. Suffice it to say that the manner in which Superfund was administered at that time leave us highly skeptical that its operational parameters could readily have been forecast by anyone outside the EPA. A typical account of Superfund's operations during this period is contained in a House Report, accompanying a predecessor bill to the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986:

The resources given to EPA were simply inadequate to fulfill the promises that were made to clean up abandoned hazardous wastes in this country. With political pressure on EPA to treat every site discovered as a high priority, EPA was virtually guaranteed to fail from the moment CERCLA passed in 1980.

To compound the problem the first administrator of the Superfund program undermined the intent of the program. Under the initial leadership of Assistant Administrator Lavelle, the program was vic-

timized by gross mismanagement and policies which limited expenditures for site cleanups, in part in an effort to dissuade Congress from extending the funding for the program beyond its scheduled expiration date of October 1, 1985. [H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1 at 55 (1985) *reprinted in* 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2835.]

In any event, we are satisfied that the Supreme Court's reference to the NCP, supplemented by the NPL, as providing "criteria that determine what expenses, at which sites, will be eligible for Superfund money" was intended to demonstrate that the pre-emption period did not commence before these guidelines were promulgated. The Court explained that

[h]aving decided that "may be compensated" should be given its ordinary meaning, we must define the category of expenses that may be compensated by Superfund. Fortunately, CERCLA itself furnishes an appropriate test. Section 105(8)(B) of CERCLA, 42 USC § 9605(8)(B) requires the President to revise the National Contingency Plan (NCP) to reflect CERCLA's provisions. As part of that revision, the President must create and revise annually a list of sites most in need of federal efforts, now known as the National Priorities List. The NCP currently specifies that removal, or immediate cleanup, will be financed by Superfund only in emergency situations, see 40 CFR § 300.65 (1985). Remedial action will be financed only for sites on the National Priorities List, *id.*, § 300.68(a). Finally, the Environmental Protection Agency, pursuant to the NCP, has proposed criteria for the use of Superfund money for natural resource claims. See 50 Fed. Reg. 9593 (1985). The NCP, therefore, provides criteria that determine what expenses, at which sites, will be eligible for Superfund money. We therefore conclude that the NCP provides the appropriate measure of

whether a given expenditure constitutes "costs of response or damages or claims which may be compensated" by Superfund. [475 U.S. at —, 89 L.Ed. 2d at 381-82 (footnote omitted).]

We find the clear thrust of the Supreme Court's opinion to be that although CERCLA established the *principle* of pre-emption, the scope of pre-emption is a regulatory rather than statutory determination. Accordingly, until the NCP was first promulgated by EPA on July 16, 1982, 47 Fed. Reg. 31,180 (1982), and then revised on September 8, 1983, to include the first NPL, 48 Fed. Reg. 40,669 (1983), no agency guidelines existed to determine those remedial or removal actions that would be *eligible* for Superfund reimbursement, and for which funding by the Spill Fund was thereby pre-empted.

We reject the State's assertion that pre-emption should cease as of September 30, 1985, the date on which taxing authorization under CERCLA expired. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9653 (repealed by Pub. L. 99-499 § 571(b), 100 Stat. 1761 (1986)). From that date until enactment of SARA on October 17, 1986, CERCLA was funded by emergency appropriations. We can discern no clear congressional intention to terminate pre-emption for the brief period during which CERCLA was financed temporarily by appropriations from general revenues rather than by excise taxes on petroleum and chemicals. Accordingly, we hold that the period of pre-emption ended on October 27, 1986, the effective date of SARA, which repealed the pre-emption language in § 114(c) of CERCLA.

Our conclusions concerning the scope and period of pre-emption will require that this matter be remanded once again to the Tax Court. The purpose of the remand will be to permit the parties to establish a record upon which the Tax Court can determine the amount of Spill Fund expenditures that was pre-empted by CERCLA. In that connection, the State points out that establishing the beginning and end of the pre-emption period does not

necessarily determine whether a particular expense incurred or paid by Spill Fund during the pre-emption period should be treated as a "pre-empted" expense. The State contends that work authorized, commenced, or completed before the pre-emption period began, but paid for during the pre-emption period, should not be deemed pre-empted.

We are generally in accord with the State's position. If expenses to remove or remediate hazardous waste that are paid by Spill Fund before pre-emption began are not inconsistent with CERCLA, it should follow that expenses committed *before* but paid *after* the effective date of pre-emption should not be treated as pre-empted. The principle is that the Spill Funds' expenditures should not be deemed pre-empted by CERCLA unless the essential decision to commit the funds was made *after* promulgation of the NCP⁴ or NPL,⁵ as the case may be. We leave to the Tax Court on remand the task of determining precisely those expenditures that were permissible and those that were pre-empted.

Remedy

Preliminarily, we note our full accord with the Tax Court's conclusion that any technical noncompliance by

⁴ As noted, the effective date of pre-emption of removal actions that meet the criteria of the NCP is July 16, 1982. We note the State's reference, in its Exceptions to the Recommendations of the Tax Court, to objections communicated to EPA concerning the vagueness of the criteria for authorization of removal actions and the EPA's response to the effect that the criteria are adequate. It is self-evident that expenditures by the Spill Act for removal actions that EPA determined to be unauthorized by the NCP criteria are not pre-empted. In cases where EPA has not determined eligibility of a removal action pursuant to the NCP criteria, the Tax Court on remand must make that evaluation in order to determine if the expenditure was pre-empted.

⁵ The effective date of pre-emption of remedial actions for sites on the NPL is the date of promulgation of the NPL, or any amendment or supplement thereof, on which such site is first listed.

plaintiffs with the provisions of *N.J.S.A. 59:49-14* does not affect plaintiffs' right to relief. — *N.J. Tax* at — (slip op. at 28).

The remedy recommended by Judge Evers is thoughtful and practical. Essentially, the Tax Court proposed that an accounting or hearing be conducted to determine the amount of the pre-empted expenditures by the Spill Fund. The Legislature would then be accorded a reasonable time period to reimburse the Spill Fund for the entire pre-empted amount, using any source of funds other than the tax imposed by the Spill Act. If the Legislature does not reimburse the Spill Fund within the designated period, the Tax Court proposed that plaintiffs receive a refund of so much of the pre-empted expenditures as bears the same proportion to the total pre-empted expenditures as the Spill Act taxes paid by plaintiffs bears to the total amount of Spill Act taxes collected. In addition, the Tax Court recommended that if the Legislature reimbursed the Spill Fund and the reimbursement caused the amount of the Fund to exceed the statutory cap originally imposed by the Spill Act, *see supra* at — (slip op. at 12), the entire excess over the cap would be paid to plaintiffs.

In considering the appropriateness of the Tax Court's recommendations as to remedy, we accept plaintiff's premise that ordinarily a taxpayer that pays a tax found to be invalid is entitled to a refund. *Mayor of Jersey City v. Riker*, 38 N.J.L. 225, 227 (Sup. Ct. 1876); *accord In Re Fees of State Bd. of Dentistry*, 84 N.J. 582, 587 (1980); *Milmar Estate, Inc. v. Borough of Fort Lee*, 36 N.J. Super. 241 (App. Div. 1955). In this litigation, however, we must address a tax that has been invalidated only in part, and for a limited period. Furthermore, in framing the appropriate relief we are obliged to consider the context in which repeal of the limited pre-emption of the Spill Act occurred.

The background and need for the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, which appropriated \$9

billion in additional funding to clean up hazardous waste sites, is summarized in the report of the House of Representatives Science and Technology Committee referred to above, *see supra* at — (slip op. at 19), that accompanied H.R. 2817, a predecessor to the bill ultimately enacted by Congress:

The Superfund program to clean up abandoned hazardous waste sites is one of the Nation's most important environmental programs designed to protect human health and the environment. It is also the most beleaguered program the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) administers. If enacted, H.R. 2817 would give EPA the flexibility to revitalize the Superfund program, ensure cleanup of abandoned hazardous chemicals, and protect human health and the environment.

Superfund was passed in 1980 to address what many believed was a relatively limited problem. The EPA was instructed to find 400 hazardous waste sites. Most believed that cleaning up a site was relatively inexpensive and involved removing containers or scraping a few inches of soil off the ground. The Agency was given \$1.6 billion to administer the cleanup of the 400 sites.

Today, five years later, our understanding of the problem posed by abandoned hazardous chemicals is entirely different. The Office of Technology Assessment now estimates there may be as many as 10,000 Superfund sites across the Nation, or an average of 23 sites per Congressional district. These sites range from industrial plants to river beds to city dumps where small businesses and households have disposed of solvents, paints and cleaning fluids. We now understand that a cleanup frequently goes far beyond simple removal of barrels. It often involves years of pumping contaminated water from aquifers. The

total cost of completing the Superfund program is estimated to be as much as \$100 billion. The total time will be decades.

* * * *

The current reauthorization, coming when it does, forces Congress to face a very fundamental policy question: how to ensure in the future that there are adequate resources, and to see that past, thoroughly repudiated, mismanagement problems are behind us.

H.R. 2817 has been written with the underlying belief that Congress should focus on ways to ensure rapid and thorough cleanup of abandoned hazardous wastes rather than on past mistakes. It is clear from the accumulating data on waste sites that EPA will never have adequate monies or manpower to address the problem itself. As a result, an underlying principle of H.R. 2817 is that Congress must facilitate cleanups of hazardous substances by the responsible parties while assuring a strong EPA oversight role with a set of tough legal enforcement standards. Equally important is the role of the communities around Superfund sites. It is here that we can ensure that cleanups and post-cleanup maintenance of the sites are carried out in compliance with the cleanup agreements for the sites. [H.R. Rep. No. 253, *supra*, at 54.]

In this connection, the repeal of section 114(c), the pre-emption provision of CERCLA, was explained by the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works in its report on S.51, another predecessor to SARA:

Clarification of section 114(c) appears desirable because of the litigation that has arisen from the original language in the statute. The litigation has been focused on the right of States to tax those substances which are taxed under the Federal Superfund law. To date, all decisions in State courts (including

recent State Supreme Court rulings) have found that the Federal Superfund law does not preempt the rights of the States to raise taxes from these substances or through other special taxes. This litigation could continue for years. Any cloud of uncertainty over the legitimacy of these taxes should be removed at the earliest possible time.

It is widely recognized that States must develop their own taxes to meet their responsibilities for the State share of the cleanup costs at Superfund sites. In addition, States have responsibilities for managing and cleaning up hazardous materials not covered by the Federal program. Clarification of section 114(c) will allow the State to move forward and develop the tax mechanisms necessary for meeting the growing funding needs for response to hazardous substance releases and participation in the Superfund program, as well as for maintaining effective State hazardous waste programs.

The primary effect of the amendment will be to remove a potential barrier to the creation of State superfund programs. The amendment may result in an increase in the number and pace of hazardous substance response actions undertaken or partially funded by States, since States will be able to raise funds to assist such hazardous substance response. [S.Rep. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. at 59, 60 (1985), *reprinted in* 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2835 (emphasis added).]

In the course of Senate debate on S.51, Senator Lautenberg of New Jersey offered this explanation for the proposed repeal of section 114(c) :

Mr. President, S. 51 clearly addresses an issue that has hindered State efforts to set up their own superfunds. Because of a suit filed in New Jersey, which questioned the right of a State to tax the same sources taxed by the Federal Superfund, State Super-

fund programs have had a cloud over them. This has certainly been the case in New Jersey, where the State was extremely reluctant to spend funds out of our spillfund without this litigation being settled. S. 51 strikes the so-called preemption language in existing law which created this legal ambiguity. Approval of the bill will end years of litigation and free States to conduct aggressive cleanup programs with their own funds. [116 Cong. Rec. S11,581 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1985 at S11581.)]

Subsequently, in the debate on the conference report of SARA, Senator Lautenberg stated that the repeal of section 114(c) would

[o]verturn the Supreme Court's Exxon versus Hunt decision, which preempted State taxing authority for State spill funds, such as New Jersey's. This provision is critical to New Jersey's plans for complementing the Federal Superfund Program with a State supported cleanup program. [135 Cong. Rec. S14,912 (daily ed. Oct 3, 1986).]

These excerpts from the legislative history of SARA reflect Congress's recognition not only of the enormity of the hazardous waste cleanup problem but also of the importance of State and local cooperation to assist the federal government in this complex and difficult undertaking. It is obvious that the repeal of section 114(c) was intended to encourage and facilitate State participation in the long-term cleanup effort.

Under these circumstances, we are constrained to fashion a remedy for the collection of Spill Act taxes during the pre-emption period that least offends the congressional purpose in repealing pre-emption. On another recent occasion involving an invalid tax statute, we used our equitable powers to construct a remedy consistent with the attendant circumstances. *See Salorio v. Glaser*, 93 N.J. 447, *cert. denied*, 464 U.S. 993, 78 L.Ed.2d 682

(1983) (holding unconstitutional the imposition of the Emergency Transfer Tax on New York residents who commuted to work in New Jersey, but restricting decision to prospective application). As we observed in *Salorio*, "Equitable remedies * * * 'are a special blend of what is necessary, what is fair, and what is workable,'" *id.* at 464 (quoting *Lemon v. Kurtzman* (*Lemon II*), *supra*, 411 U.S. at 200, 36 L.Ed.2d at 161).

Accordingly, we conclude that under these unique circumstances the appropriate remedy in this matter is that which best implements the intent of Congress in adopting SARA and the intent of the Legislature in adopting and amending the Spill Act. The uncontradicted record before us indicates that the Spill Fund's needs are likely to exceed its resources for some time. The Legislature has only recently increased both the tax rate and the tax base in order to augment the Spill Fund's revenues. Congress has evidenced its intention to encourage an enhanced State role in hazardous waste cleanup.

In this setting, a partial tax refund to plaintiffs should be a remedy of last resort. Instead, we adopt that part of the Tax Court's recommendation that conditions the payment of a pro-rata refund upon the Legislature's failure to reimburse the Spill Fund for the amount of expenditures found to be pre-empted. In our view, reimbursement of the Spill Fund from non-Spill Act revenues vindicates the Spill Fund's payment of pre-empted expenses in a manner most consistent with the objectives of Congress and the Legislature. We conclude that a period of six months from the final determination of the amount of pre-empted expenditures, from which no appeal is pending or can be taken, is sufficient for the Legislature to take action to reimburse the fund. In this connection, we hold that reimbursement of the Spill Fund must be for the entire amount of pre-empted expenditures, and reject the State's contention that pro-rata reimbursement proportionate to the plaintiffs' share of Spill Act taxes

is sufficient. The thrust of this remedy is to make the Spill Fund whole.

In the event the Legislature does not appropriate funds sufficient to reimburse the Spill Fund for the full amount of pre-empted expenditures within such six-month period, the Fund shall refund to the plaintiffs, pro rata, so much of the pre-empted expenditures as bears the same proportion to the total pre-empted expenditures as the Spill Act taxes paid by plaintiffs bears to the total amount of Spill Act taxes collected. In view of the repeal of the cap provisions of the Spill Act as originally enacted, the Tax Court's recommendation in paragraph 4(a) of its Summary is no longer appropriate. — *N.J. Tax* at — (slip op. at 39).

For the reasons stated, the recommendations of the Tax Court, as modified by this opinion, are adopted. The matter is remanded to the Tax Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

Justices Clifford, Handler and Pollock and Judges Pressler and King join in this opinion. Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices O'Hern and Garibaldi did not participate.

APPENDIX B

TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY

September Term 1984

A-66

EXXON CORPORATION, *et als*,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

vs

ROBERT HUNT, *et als*,
Defendants-Respondents.

On Remand from Supreme Court of New Jersey

RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO REMAND

JOHN F. EVERS, J.T.C.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The United States Supreme Court in this matter, (reported at 106 S. Ct. 1103 (1986)) interpreted § 114 (c) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601, *et seq.* as preempting contributions to any state fund that is intended to pay for the same types of expenses that may be paid by the Fund (superfund) established under CERCLA. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court to the extent that it held that the New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act (Spill Act), N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11 *et seq.*, could constitutionally impose a tax on plaintiffs to sup-

port expenditures which are eligible for superfund financing. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court to the extent that it held that the Spill Act could constitutionally impose a tax to support expenditures that are not eligible for superfund financing.

The purposes of the Spill Act which were found to be non-preempted by the Supreme Court because they are clearly beyond the scope of CERCLA and, therefore, not covered by § 114(c), 42 U.S.C. 9614(c), include: (1) to compensate third parties for damages resulting from hazardous substance discharges; (2) to pay personnel and equipment costs; (3) to administer the New Jersey spill fund; and (4) to conduct research. The purposes of the Spill Act which the Supreme Court found to be preempted by § 114(c) because they fall within the scope of CERCLA are (1) the financing of governmental clean-up of hazardous waste sites, including remedial costs for sites on the National Priority List (NPL) and removal costs that are eligible for superfund compensation under the terms of the National Contingency Plan (NCP); and (2) the reimbursement of third parties for cleanup costs, except to the extent that these two categories of expenditures are intended to provide the 10% state share of remedial costs. The Supreme Court held that, to the extent the Spill Act permits taxation to support preempted expenditures, it cannot stand, and remanded the case to the New Jersey Supreme Court which remand, in pertinent part, stated:

We leave to the New Jersey Supreme Court the state law question whether, or to what extent, the nonpre-empted provisions of the statute are severable from the pre-empted provisions. . . .

. . . [T]he case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 106 S. Ct. 1116-1117.

I. ISSUES (AND PROBLEMS) PRESENTED DUE TO THE NATURE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REMAND.

While that part of the Supreme Court remand which leaves to the New Jersey Supreme Court the state law question whether, or to what extent, the non-preempted provisions of the statute are severable from the preempted provisions is clear, the language concerning further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion is unclear and, it is submitted, its intent can only be ascertained through an analysis of the Court's reasoning as expressed in its opinion. Such question arises not only as a legal proposition but out of practical considerations as well.

A cursory reading of the remand suggests that the Court must focus, at least initially and perhaps exclusively, on the severability issue. Following a resolution of that question however, the question arises—what now? Unlike the language employed in *Exxon Corp. v. Eager-ton*, 462 U.S. 176 (1983), (also authored by Justice Marshall and specifically referred to by the Justice in the instant remand), where, after concluding that a portion of an Alabama tax (on oil and gas extracted from Alabama wells) was preempted, the high court said:

Since the severability of the pass-through prohibition from the remainder of the 1979 amendments is a matter of state law, we remand to the Supreme Court of Alabama for that court to determine whether the partial invalidity of the pass-through prohibition entitles appellants to a refund of some or all of the taxes paid under protest. [at 197]

here the Court made no reference to the question of refunds whatsoever. The reasons suggested for the absence of such refund language in the instant matter are discussed *infra*, but in any event it appears that the New Jersey Supreme Court, as well as the parties, assumed

that the real question presented on remand dealt with refunds—and then not “if” but rather “how much”. (Note that the New Jersey Supreme Court, in its remand, directed the Tax Court to make such calculations).¹

In an apparent attempt to formulate a method of determining the exact amounts of spill fund monies which were devoted to preempted purposes and thence a determination of the exact refunds due each plaintiff, the parties embarked on a course of considerable “informal” discovery. (See appendix in support of plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment). It soon became apparent (to the parties and this Court) that such an undertaking, if pursued to a conclusion, would be staggering in terms of time and money. For example, Robert Hunt, (who from January 1978 until January 1986 was the Chief Executive of the spill fund), stated, “It would be extremely difficult, if possible at all, to determine which expenditures were for work completed or contracted for before April, 1981 but paid after that date,”² and “Numerous other examples can be given for sites where significant amounts of spill fund monies were spent for cleanup at a site which was eventually put on the NPL.” (National Priority List). (Hunt affid. July 16, 1986, p. 6).³

¹ Justice Stevens, in his dissent, also recognized the absence of any direction as to payment of refunds. He said:

But since the Court concludes that the Spill Act is “preempted in part,” *ante*, at 1; accord, *id.*, at 19, it must confront the difficult question of relief. In keeping with its “partial preemption” analysis, the Court should advise the New Jersey courts how they should calculate the partial refund of taxes to which appellants are *presumably* entitled on remand. 106 S.Ct. 1120. [emphasis supplied]

² While CERCLA was effective in December 1980, superfund tax was not collected until April 1981.

³ Although Congress directed that the superfund program be implemented through a revised NCP to be adopted by June 1981,

Additionally, concerning the problems associated with extensive discovery, David Mack, (prior to his appointment as Acting Administrator of spill fund in February 1986, Mr. Mack was a regulatory officer of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (DEP)), whose responsibilities included the monitoring of the spill fund's activities and who was also involved in New Jersey's hazardous waste cleanup program since 1980, which involvement included negotiating contracts and agreements under the superfund program between DEP and United States Environmental Agency (EPA), stated:

This information, (a list of expenditures at sites on the NPL from December 1980 [effective date of CERCLA] to the present), was provided [to plaintiffs], but it should be noted that the costs listed include expenditures contracted for and paid prior to listing on the NPL; expenditures contracted for prior to listing on NPL but paid after listing; administrative charges billed directly to the project account; costs later reimbursed by EPA for advanced funding; costs EPA declared to be ineligible for funding; and costs which may be credited in the future against the State's mandated 10% share. Our records reveal the date on which invoices are paid, but not the date on which the work was contracted for or actually performed. . . .

To discover the date of performance, however, every invoice would have to be examined. Such an undertaking is staggering in terms of time and resources when 99 New Jersey sites—the number cur-

the EPA did not meet this deadline and the NCP, revised pursuant to CERCLA, was not published until July 16, 1982. Once published the NCP limited superfund expenditures for remedial (long-term cleanup) actions to sites on the NPL which was to be a compilation of the worst sites nationwide. However, EPA did not officially promulgate the NPL until September 8, 1983, more than a year after the NCP was promulgated.

rently on the NPL—are involved. At *least* 1,800 invoices would have to be scrutinized. Indeed, the spill fund would have to hire either a contractor or new staff to perform this lengthy task. Additionally, these invoices would have to be scrutinized to determine whether non-preempted costs such as administrative costs had been included. [Mack affid. July 15, 1986, pp. 5 & 6]

Under the circumstances it was agreed that certain legal issues, (arising primarily from the imprecise directions of the United States Supreme Court), should first be addressed; the thought being that a decision on those questions would possibly decrease the time and expense, and perhaps completely avoid the need, of such a detailed accounting. Accordingly extensive briefs were submitted concerning the issues of prospectivity vis-a-vis retroactivity, (of the Supreme Court decision); severability; extent of refunds, if any; and the applicability (and compliance with, if applicable) of N.J.S.A. 54:14-14, (State Tax Uniform Procedure Law).⁴

II. SHOULD THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION BE APPLIED PROSPECTIVELY?

As indicated in the Statement of the Case the United States Supreme Court remanded this matter for the purpose of determining, "whether, or to what extent, the non-preempted provisions of the statute are severable from the preempted provisions." 106 *S. Ct.* at 1116. To carry out the Court's mandate, the first question to be addressed is whether its order to determine severability of the preempted portions of the Spill Act is to have

⁴ Plaintiffs also seek an injunction against enforcement of the spill tax taxing provisions until the New Jersey Supreme Court resolves the remand from the United States Supreme Court in the instant matter.

Oral argument was waived pursuant to R. 1:6-2.

retroactive or prospective effect. The answer to that question turns on whether the decision itself is to be applied retroactively or prospectively. It is determined that the decision is to have prospective effect only if it follows that severability of the Spill Act for the period prior to March 10, 1986, the date of the United States Supreme Court decision, is not an issue because the Act will be treated as valid up to that date. Such decision will also determine whether plaintiffs are entitled to refunds for amounts paid for preempted purposes prior to March 10, 1986. If it is to be applied prospectively it follows that there can be no refunds for amounts paid prior to that date even though the spill fund used tax monies for preempted purposes. Defendants' position is that the decision must be given prospective effect and consequently severability is an issue only from March 10, 1986 and further that plaintiffs are not entitled to refunds for any tax paid prior thereto.

Plaintiffs argue that defendants' motion for prospective effect ignores the limited scope of the remand by the United States Supreme Court, which according to plaintiffs, was confined strictly to the question of severability. Because the Spill Act was not devoted exclusively to purposes preempted by § 114(c) of CERCLA, according to plaintiffs it was necessary for the United States Supreme Court to remand this matter, "for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion." 106 S. Ct. at 1117. Plaintiffs further contend that the high court was quite explicit as to the scope that would be open on remand:

State legislation is invalid 'to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law,' *Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Energy Resources Commission*, 461 U.S. 190, 204 . . . (1983), and such a conflict has been demonstrated in this case. We leave to the New Jersey Supreme Court the State-law question whether, or to what extent, the non-preempted provisions of the statute are severable from the pre-

empted provisions. *Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton*, 462 U.S. 176, 196-97 (1983).

Id. at 1116.

Thus, they assert that the only issue on remand is the state-law question as to the possible severability of the non-preempted provisions of the Spill Act. Defendants' argument that plaintiffs should be denied refunds of all taxes paid prior to the United States Supreme Court decision does not fall within the scope of the remand, according to plaintiffs. Thus it is argued that to hold that the decision should be applied only prospectively would result in a complete nullification of the Court's decision.

I disagree with plaintiffs' contention that prospectivity is a non-issue. As noted earlier I do not find the remand language of the United States Supreme Court to be as "crystal clear" as suggested by plaintiffs. Secondly, although the courts initially espoused the common law doctrine that an invalidated statute must be deemed a nullity from the moment of its adoption ("... in legal contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed," *Norton v. Shelton County*, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886)), the rigidity of the rule and the impractical and harsh results which it compelled in invalidating all past transactions made in reliance upon a purportedly legitimate statute led the Supreme Court in *Chicot Co. Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank*, 308 U.S. 371 (1940), to reason that the "broad statements" of absolute retrospective invalidity espoused in *Norton* were unjustified.

Subsequent to *Chicot Co. Drainage*, *supra*, two United States Supreme Court cases conclusively silenced the *Norton* doctrine of invariable and total retroactivity. In the first, *Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson*, 404 U.S. 97 (1971), the Court held that its earlier decision in *Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.*, 395 U.S. 352 (1969) should be applied prospectively only. In *Rodrigue* the Court had

held that state law would be incorporated into federal law and applied in actions for personal injuries on fixed structures located on the Outer Continental Shelf. The plaintiff in *Chevron* had filed suit prior to the Court's decision in *Rodrigue* and had relied on the longer statute of limitations under admiralty law which at that time was held to be applicable in actions brought under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. In holding that *Rodrigue* would be applied prospectively with the result that the plaintiff's action was not time barred, the Court set up a three-part test to determine whether a particular decision should be applied prospectively or retrospectively. First, in order to be applied prospectively, the decision "must establish a new principle of law either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied . . . or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. . . ." 404 U.S. at 106. Secondly, a determination must be made whether the purpose and effect of the new rule will be furthered or retarded by its retrospective application. *Id.* at 107. Third, the Court should weigh "the equity imposed by retroactive application" and should avoid retroactivity where to do so "could produce substantial inequitable results. . . ." *Ibid.*

To preclude retroactivity, defendants must satisfy all three parts of the *Chevron Oil* test. *EEOC v. MTC Gear Corp.*, 595 F. Supp. 712, 715 (D.C. Ill. 1984). An examination of the facts here leads to the conclusion that, while parts two and three of the *Chevron* test may be satisfied, the first part is not.

In ruling that its earlier decision in *Rodrigue* was to have prospective application the *Chevron* Court said:

Rodrigue was not only a case of first impression in this Court under the Lands Act, but it also effectively overruled a long line of decisions by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit holding that ad-

mirality law, including the doctrine of laches, applies through the Lands Act. See, e. g., *Pure Oil Co. v. Snipes*, 293 F. 2d 60; *Movable Offshore Co. v. Ousley*, 345 F. 2d 870; *Loffland Bros. Co. v. Roberts*, 386 F. 2d 540. When the respondent was injured, for the next two years until he instituted his lawsuit, and for the ensuing year of pretrial proceedings, these Court of Appeals decisions represented the law governing his case. It cannot be assumed that he did or could foresee that this consistent interpretation of the Lands Act would be overturned. The most he could do was to rely on the law as it then was. [404 U.S. 107]

While acknowledging that § 114(c) of CERCLA was “not a model of legislative draftsmanship,” 106 S. Ct. at 1109, the Supreme Court decided the case based on the well established principles of express preemption as applied to the language of the statute. It held that it, (§ 114(c)) was meant to forbid the States from imposing taxes to finance certain types of expenditures. This case is therefore significantly different from *Rodrigue* which overruled a long line of decisions.

Furthermore, the situation here also significantly differs from *Lemon v. Kurtzman*, 411 U.S. 192 (1973) (Lemon II) where the Court held that its earlier invalidation of a Pennsylvania statute (*Lemon v. Kurtzman*, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (Lemon I)), should be applied prospectively. The Pennsylvania statute had permitted the State to reimburse private sectarian schools for certain educational services. A divided Court struck down the Pennsylvania statute under the establishment clause of the First Amendment. The plaintiffs then sought to enjoin the State from reimbursing the schools for the current school year although the schools had already performed the services for which they were to obtain reimbursement. The Court refused to enjoin the reimbursement. Nor does the instant matter present a

Solario type situation, (*Solorio v. Glaser*, 93 N.J. 447 1983), where the Court held that its decision invalidating the emergency transportation tax (ETT) under the Privileges and Immunities Clause would be applied prospectively.

In *Lemon II* and *Solario* the state expenditures were held to be invalid under general provisions of the federal Constitution, which necessarily must await a definitive court ruling before their contours are established. See *Lemon II*, 411 U.S. at 108. Here, by contrast, Congress commanded in December 1980 that, "no person may be required to contribute to any fund the purpose of which is to pay compensation for claims . . . which may be compensated under CERCLA." 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c). The United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the preemptive language of § 114(c) which was based on the Federal Supremacy clause, did not "establish a new principle of law either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied . . . or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. . . ." *Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson*, *supra*, at 106.

Additionally it appears that defendant's "reliance" argument is questionable. The legislative history of CERCLA § 114(c) reveals that the defendants were aware of the statute's probable preemptive effect on the spill fund. Jerry English, (former DEP Commissioner), observed that the predecessor to § 114(c) would have the effect of "'swiss-cheese preemption', because it would shoot holes in State laws to the extent incidents or damages are compensable under the federal law. . . ." The Environmental Law Institute, *Superfund; A Legislative History* 534 (1983). (Supplemental appendix to plaintiffs' brief in opposition to defendants' motion for summary judgment and in support of plaintiffs' motion for an injunction). Of note also are the statements of Rob-

ert Hunt. "Upon the adoption of the Superfund Act in December 1980, I became concerned about the impact of the preemption language on the spending alternatives of the spill fund", (Hunt affid., p. 2), and again, ". . . we in New Jersey felt that we had to be prepared to use the spill fund to address pressing State priorities even if we were risking the possibility of some conflict in regard to the preemption language contained in the Superfund Act." (Hunt affid., p. 4).

As earlier noted both *Lemon II* and *Salorio* involved the invalidation of State laws on *constitutional grounds*. In such cases, courts are entitled to shape their decrees in accordance with traditional equitable principles unconstrained by legislative directives. This case, however, involves an explicit statement of policy by the Congress on a matter indisputably within its authority that gives courts no such discretion to withhold relief to persons protected by the statute. Congress, in § 152 of CERCLA expressly stated that § 114(c) would become effective on passage, (in contrast with the predecessor version in H.R. 85 which had a 180 day delay in its preemption provision). Thus it is clear that under *Chevron*, and § 114(c), the courts are not permitted to contradict the legislative command based on their conceptions of equity or public policy. In *TVA v. Hill*, 437 U.S. 153, 193-95 (1978), the Court refused to exercise any equitable discretion to deny relief to plaintiffs once it determined that the statute had been violated and that Congress had left no room for equity courts to carve out exceptions to its clear commands. *Id. Accord Badaracco v. Comm'r.*, 464 U.S. 386, 398 (1984).

The finding that the United States Supreme Court's decision should be applied retroactively and not prospectively gives rise to the next question which will now be addressed.

III. TO WHAT EXTENT SHOULD THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISION BE RETROACTIVELY APPLIED?

The answer to this question is found by scrutinizing the Supreme Court decision itself. We know that § 114 (c) states:

Except as provided in this chapter, no person may be required to contribute to any fund, the purpose of which is to pay compensation for claims for any costs of response or damages or claims which may be compensated under this subchapter. 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c).

We know that the high court, based on § 114(c), found that in some areas there was an overlap in the superfund-spillfund purposes. We also know that those purposes were identified as (1) the financing of governmental cleanup of hazardous waste sites, including remedial costs for sites on the NPL and removal costs that are eligible for superfund compensation under the terms of NCP; and (2) the reimbursement of third parties for cleanup costs, except to the extent that these two categories of expenditures are intended to provide the state share of remedial costs. We further know that it was not the collection of the Spill Act tax that the Court found to be improper but rather certain expenditures made from the fund.

Our remaining task is to determine whether the "purpose" of the Spill Fund is *to pay costs* that we have found to fall within the scope of pre-emption.

Those parts of the statute that permit Spill Fund *expenditures* beyond this state share for remedial costs for sites on the National Priority List, or for removal costs that are eligible for Superfund compensation under the terms of the NCP, are preempted by § 114(c). 106 S. Ct. 1116 [emphasis supplied]

What we do not know, and what neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Congress knew, because at the time of enactment of CERCLA and its § 114(c) they could not know, were the specific sites within the scope of the preempted purposes. New Jersey knew what it did but the United States did not know what it (the Federal Government) would do or where.

The Court found that two of the six purposes of spill fund were preempted.

As we have explained above, the Spill Fund may be used for six purposes: (1) to finance governmental cleanup of hazardous waste sites; (2) to reimburse third parties for cleanup costs; (3) to compensate third parties for damage resulting from hazardous substance discharges; (4) to pay personnel and equipment costs; (5) to administer the fund itself; and (6) to conduct research. Of these the latter four are clearly beyond the scope of CERCLA, and are therefore not covered by § 114(c). The first two are within the scope of CERCLA, except to the extent that they are intended to provide the 10% state share of remedial costs. 106 S. Ct. 1116

Obviously, in recognition that such conclusion was abstract and without more would not provide a resolution to the conflict, the Court found a yardstick with which to measure those expenditures which may be compensated by superfund. Without an appropriate measure those expenditures found in the above-noted two categories would be preempted notwithstanding that, at least some of them, could never be paid from superfund. The Court said:

Having decided that "may be compensated" should be given its ordinary meaning, we must define the category of expenses that may be compensated by Superfund. Fortunately, CERCLA itself furnishes an appropriate test. Section 105(8)(B) of CERCLA,

42 U.S.C. § 9605(8)(B), requires the President to revise the National Contingency Plan (NCP) to reflect CERCLA's provisions. As part of that revision, the President must create and revise annually a list of sites most in need of federal efforts, now known as the National Priorities List. The NCP currently specifies that removal, or immediate clean-up, *will* be financed by Superfund only in emergency situations, see 40 CFR § 300.65 (1985). Remedial action *will* be financed only for sites on the National priorities List, *id.* § 300.68(a). Finally, the Environmental Protection Agency, pursuant to the NCP, has proposed criteria for the use of Superfund money for natural resource claims. See 50 Fed. Reg. 993 (1985). The NCP, therefore, provides criteria that determine what expenses, at which sites, *will* be eligible for Superfund money. We therefore conclude that the NCP provides the appropriate measure of whether a given expenditure constitutes "costs of response or damages or claims which may be compensated" by Superfund. 106 S. Ct. 1115 [emphasis supplied] ⁵

Close scrutiny of the foregoing language discloses however that the NCP only specifies that removal, or immediate cleanup expenses, will be paid only in emergency cases. As to remedial (long term) activities superfund may pay those expenses only in connection with the sites appearing on the NPL. Therefore, while the NCP serves as a measure for preempted emergency (immediate) cleanup expenses, it can only be in conjunction with the NLP that it can likewise serve in connection with remedial (long term) preempted expenditures.

⁵ Curiously the Court used the word "will" (be financed) (be eligible) in deciding the class of expenditures which "may" be compensated. See *Exxon v. Hunt*, 97 N.J. 526, 534 (1984) where Justice Clifford, quoting from the Tax Court opinion (4 N.J.Tax 294, 307 (Tax Ct. 1982)), stated, "[t]he seemingly simple, but often misused and misapplied word 'may' is anything but unambiguous."

It cannot be doubted that the Supreme Court was aware that the NCP and NPL were not effective on the date CERCLA was enacted, when the Court declared the NCP and NPL to be the guidelines of preempted expenditures. Had the Supreme Court believed that expenditures made before the adoption of the NPL and NCP were subject to the preemption provision, it is reasonably assumed that it would have provided a second guide for expenditures preempted during the initial period following the adoption of CERCLA. Since no mention was made of that time period, it is obvious that the Court did not believe that any spill fund expenditures were preempted until after the superfund program was in place and ready to operate pursuant to the promulgated NCP and NPL.

That conclusion is reenforced by reference to 42 U.S.C. § 9611 which defines the types of removal actions which will be financed by superfund. Subsection (a) (2) states that superfund may be used for:

Payment of any claim for necessary response costs incurred by any other person *as a result of carrying out the national contingency plan* established under section 1321(c) of Title 33 and amended by section 9605 of this title: Provided, however, that such costs must be approved under said plan and certified by the responsible Federal official. . . . [42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (2).] [emphasis supplied]

Without the NCP this section provides no guidance whatsoever. Prior to publication of the NCP and NPL, only to the extent that superfund money was actually committed to New Jersey projects did the State have reason to know that spill fund expenditures were preempted. In those instances, according to defendants, no spill fund monies were spent.

Further scrutiny of the above Supreme Court language reveals that, in its reference to the use of NCP as an appropriate measure, it recognized that the NCP speaks

to the future, not to the past. Thus reason and logic dictate that in defining the immediate cleanup purposes which are preempted it could only be from the date of promulgation of the NCP that the expenditures would be preempted. Similarly it was only upon the promulgation of the NPL that expenditures in the prohibited remedial category are prohibited. Any other interpretation would render unintelligible the Court's reference to "what expenses, at which sites, will be eligible for superfund money." 106 S. Ct. at 1115.

The revised NCP was promulgated July 16, 1982 (42 Fed. Reg. 31180) although the first NPL was not promulgated (as part of the NCP) until September 8, 1983.⁶ Accordingly, if spill fund is found to be severable and if plaintiffs are entitled to refunds, the refunds will be calculated from those dates.

In arriving at this conclusion I have not overlooked plaintiffs' claim that from the enactment of CERCLA, New Jersey had sufficient guidance to know what sites would be eligible for superfund and could have amended the Spill Tax to reflect such "would-be eligibility."⁷

⁶ The following provision was included in the Federal Register concerning those dates:

Under Section 305 of CERCLA, this revised Plan cannot take effect until Congress has had at least sixty "calendar days of continuous session" from the date of promulgation in which to review the Plan. Since the actual length of this review period is affected by congressional action, EPA will publish a notice in the Federal Register at the end of the review period announcing the effective date of the Plan.

Notwithstanding this provision and the absence of any publication in the Federal Register, defendants accept these dates as the dates of final adoption of the NCP and NPL.

⁷ See Appendix in support of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and particularly the following exhibits which, according to plaintiffs, prove that:

1. Chemical Control and Goose Farm had already qualified for funding under § 311 of the Clean Water Act (Ex. E and M) leaving no doubt that they would be included on the NPL.

[Continued]

At the outset it must be noted that plaintiffs' conclusions are based on information furnished by defendants. Furthermore it should be remembered that CERCLA was not even signed into law until December 1980. Clearly no expenditures prior to that date could be considered preempted. Beyond that, taxing authority for CERCLA was not effective until April 1981. Preemption could not have been contemplated before that date. Moreover plaintiffs use figures from the Spill Fund Annual Report for 1982 and 1983 which included all expenditures made at sites from the inception of the spill fund in 1977 until June 30, 1983. Again, these figures include expenditures

⁷ [Continued]

2. The NPL itself was to be compiled on the basis of the Federal Hazard Ranking System (HRS). Seventy-two sites were submitted as candidates initially by New Jersey. (Ex. Q, p. 2).

3. Pursuant to the HRS, in February 1981, four sites in New Jersey; Bridgeport, Burnt Fly Bog, Kin-Buc and Lipari Landfill were selected for funding by superfund for remedial site study and design. (Ex. N).

4. The Abandoned Site Cleanup Report issued by the DEP on May 1, 1981 (Ex. M) disclosed that as of that date, application for superfund money was pending on Chemical Control and Goose Farm, and that superfund awards had already been made on Burnt Fly Bog, Bridgeport Rental, Kin-Buc and the Lipari Landfill.

5. In July 1981, EPA listed its rating scores (Ex. O) for compilation of the Interim Priority List. New Jersey had 16 sites which received high rankings. In addition to the six above mentioned sites, they included Price Landfill, Pijack Farm, Spence Farm, Lone Pine Landfill, Motel Dennis, Williams Property, Upper Freehold, Kryswaty Farm, King of Prussia and Bog Creek Farm (Ex. O).

6. In October 1981, EPA issued the Interim Priority List of 115 of the Nation's worst sites. Of this number, eleven sites were from New Jersey. (Ex. P).

7. In December 1982, EPA released its NPL; of the 418 hazardous waste sites listed, 65 were from New Jersey. (Ex. Q, p. 2).

8. Since that time, the NPL has been amended so that currently 99 sites from New Jersey are on the NPL. (Ex. I, Att. II).

made before CERCLA was enacted as well as for non-preempted purposes at the sites. Furthermore, it is irrelevant that spill fund expenditures were made for NPL sites as there is no limitation of the use of any or all of spill fund monies at NPL sites for non-preempted purposes.

As to plaintiffs' claim that certain projects "without question" constitute removal actions within the meaning of CERCLA, it appears that plaintiffs' erroneously relied on the statute, rather than the NCP for description of a removal action and further ignored 40 *C.F.R.* 300.65 which establishes criteria for removal actions and limits the amount of time or money that can be spent on a removal action. In pertinent part 40 *C.F.R.* 300.65(a) (3) states:

Removal actions, other than those authorized under Section 104(b) of CERCLA, shall be terminated after \$1 million has been obligated for the action or six months have elapsed, unless the lead agency determines that (certain factors exist at the site).

It further appears that plaintiffs have not thoroughly analyzed nor utilized all of the information supplied on which they rely. By way of example, it appears that the figures recited for the projects targeted by plaintiffs do not necessarily represent what plaintiffs imply. Exhibit L was provided to plaintiffs with a cover memo addressed to a Deputy Attorney General which cautioned against misuse of the figures provided. The figures represent the total amounts spent at any site which has ever been included on the NPL including money spent prior to December 1980 (effective date of CERCLA) and certainly prior to the adoption of the revised NCP, as well as money spent after CERCLA's taxing authority expired.⁸

⁸ CERCLA was a temporary experiment; the authorization to collect the tax and to appropriate general revenues expired on September 30, 1985. On April 1, 1986 Congress appropriated a "one-

It also includes amounts which were later reimbursed by the Capital Fund (general revenue account) if the project was later found to have been an emergency type removal action which was not carried out in accordance with the NCP. Plaintiffs cannot claim any impropriety for preempted expenditures which have been reimbursed to the spill fund.

IV. SEVERABILITY: ARE THE PREEMPTED PROVISIONS OF THE SPILL ACT SEVERABLE?

It is axiomatic that the non-preempted provisions of a statute can escape invalidity only to the extent they can be severed from the preempted provisions. It is recognized that the doctrine of severability must be applied with caution for, in the enforcement of valid portions of a statute which contains invalid portions also, there is a danger of judicial usurpation of the legislative power. *Washington Nat'l. Ins. Co. v. Board of Review*, 1 N.J. 545, 556 (1949). Accordingly, the party seeking severance must establish that (1) the Legislature clearly manifested its intention that it would not have enacted the valid provisions independently of the invalid provisions and (2) the valid and invalid provisions are not so intimately connected with and dependent upon each other so as to make the statute one composite whole. See *Affiliated Distillers Brands Corp. v. Sills*, 60 N.J. 342, 345-46 (1972); *Lane Distrib. Inc. v. Tilton*, 7 N.J. 349, 369-70 (1951).

Admittedly funding for the cleanup and removal of hazardous substances eligible for Superfund financing was within the purpose of the New Jersey Spill Tax. Equally as clear is that funding for those purposes found to be not preempted was also included. The problem, as

shot" infusion of \$150,000,000 which was available for obligations only until May 31, 1986. P.L. 99-270. On October 17, 1986 new Superfund legislation was adopted which provides for an appropriation of \$9,000,000,000.

presented by plaintiffs, is that all purposes are funded by a single tax. According to plaintiffs the tax rate and the expenditures it supports constitute an integral whole, intimately connected and interdependent rendering it impossible for the court to sever the non-preempted items of spill fund since severance would require the establishment of a new tax rate. Citing the *N.J. Const. Art. VI, § 6, par. 1* (1947), which states that the taxing power is vested exclusively in the Legislature, plaintiffs argue that, as a matter of constitutional law, the New Jersey judiciary is prohibited from recomputing a tax rate for the spill fund to reflect expenditures for non-preempted purposes. Since the spill fund has only one tax rate which is invalid and incapable of judicial recomputation, the entire taxing scheme is invalid, according to plaintiffs.

To the extent that the Spill Act contains a single tax that cannot be apportioned between its preempted and non-preempted purposes, plaintiffs are correct. To the extent that the fact of a single tax rate renders the act incapable of severability, plaintiffs' argument misses the point.

As the Supreme Court noted, the issue of whether an invalid portion of a state statute is severable from the remainder of the statute is an issue of state law. This Supreme Court has consistently applied the long established "principle of separability" noting that "the essential inquiry is whether the lawmaking body designed that the enactment should stand or fall as a unitary whole." *State v. Lanza*, 27 N.J. 516, 527 (1958). The inclusion of a severability clause in the statute, as is included in the Spill Act, will not necessarily resolve the issue completely. Such a clause will reverse the presumption that an act is only intended to "operate as an entirety. . . ." *Id.* at 528. However, the court must also determine whether the required severance would have been within the Legislature's intention or whether the Legislature

would have concluded that "the particular provision is so interwoven with the invalid clauses so that it cannot stand alone." *Id.* at 527. The court must be able to say with assurance that "the Legislature would have intended the remainder of the statute to stand alone"; *Affiliated Distillers Brand Corp. v. Sills, supra* and would have enacted the statute without the offending clause. *Affiliated Distillers Brand Corp. v. Sills, supra.*

This test can be met "where the principle object of the statute is constitutional, and the objectionable provision can be excised without substantial impairment of the general purpose. . . ." *State v. Lanza, supra*, at 528. There must be no conflict between the purpose for which the Legislature originally enacted the statute and the statute as it remains with the offending portions excised. *N.J. Chapt., Am. J. P. N.J. State Bd. of Prof. Planners*, 48 N.J. 581, 593 (1967).

Finally, as earlier noted, when excising the invalid provisions, the courts must be cautious not to "usurp the legislative function of lawmaking." *Affiliated Distillers Brand Corp. v. Sills, supra*, at 346.

The Legislature adopted the Spill Act to protect the citizens and the environment of the State from harm resulting from discharge of petroleum and other hazardous substances. The Legislature specifically declared that it intended;

. . . [b]y the passage of this Act to exercise the powers of this State to control the transfer and storage of hazardous substances and to provide liability for damage sustained within this State as a result of any discharge of said substances, by requiring the prompt containment and removal of such pollution and substances, and to provide a fund for swift and adequate compensation to resort businesses and other persons damaged by such discharge. [N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11(a)]

From this introductory section alone, it is clear that the Legislature had numerous concerns which it intended to address through this act: the desire to minimize the chances for discharges of hazardous substances; the need for prompt action to remedy real or potential discharges; and the concern that individuals and businesses not be unfairly harmed by such discharges. The tax imposed by the Act is credited to the spill fund which is authorized to finance spill response and waste site cleanups, certain damages claims resulting from hazardous discharges, personnel and equipment costs of the DEP associated with enforcement of the Act, the administration of the spill fund and research concerning pollution and cleanup techniques, including ocean pollutions. *N.J.S.A.* 58:10-23.11(o). Thus, a primary object of the Spill Act, (and CERCLA) was to create a funding mechanism to finance as broad a response to the problem of actual and potential hazardous substance discharges in New Jersey as reasonably feasible.

The United States Supreme Court recognized the importance of the problem addressed by both the Spill Act and CERCLA and accordingly held that, "the State was entitled to *collect taxes*," to address the great risk to the public presented by discharges of hazardous substances, but that, "the State was not permitted to *spend* that money for any of the types of projects which EPA intended to finance," with superfund. Quite simply put, it was the nature of certain expenditures and not the tax collected to fund *all* the expenditures made and to be made from the fund in furtherance of the *overall* purposes of the Spill Act that the Court found to be objectionable. In their argument that the single unapportionable tax required by the Act renders it non-severable, plaintiffs overlook that important distinction drawn by the Court. While the tax cannot be apportioned, the preempted and non-preempted purposes and the expenditures made in furtherance thereof, are identifiable.

This Supreme Court found in *Schmoll v. Creecy*, 54 N.J. 194 (1969) that when a statute would be unconstitutional if applied to one set of facts, the courts should not stumble over, "mechanical terms, (but rather) the sounder course is to consider what is involved and decide from the sense of the situation whether the Legislature would want the statute to succumb." *Id.* at 202. There should be no doubt here, after reviewing the purposes of the statute and the intent of the Legislature, in light of the Supreme Court's findings, that as much of the Spill Act as is possible to survive, should survive.

In *State v. DeSantis*, 65 N.J. 462 (1974) the Court was faced with invalidating the State's obscenity statute or reading in to it several conditions which the United States Supreme Court had recently held must be a part of a constitutional obscenity statute. The Court decided to "judicially salvage" the statute, reading in the necessary conditions, even though to do so the Court would have to make some legislative policy decisions and even though the Legislature would have to completely rewrite the statute in the near future. *Id.* at 472-473. In this instance, the Spill Act will not necessarily need to be rewritten and the Court will not have to make any legislative policy decisions. The Court will only have to hold that the Act must be read in conjunction with § 114(c) of CERCLA.

This matter is not dissimilar to *U.S.A. Chamber of Commerce v. State*, 89 N.J. 131 (1982) where The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was found to preempt the State's "Strikebreakers Act" to the extent that its provisions applied to employers and employees within the NLRA. Finding that the "legislature would likely want the statute to remain to the extent that it may . . . (and finding) no impediment to such judicial surgery as will bring the statute within the [Federal] Constitution," the Court read the necessary restrictions into the statute.

Id. at 154 citing *State v. Zito*, 54 N.J. 206, 218 (1969). The same surgical procedures should be performed on the Spill Act.

In view of the foregoing it is submitted that the Court will not be usurping any legislative prerogative by deleting the preempted purposes from the Spill Act. This reduced definition of the scope of the fund's authorization will not diminish the importance of the remaining portions of the statute. More importantly, the remaining purposes are in no way dependent on the excised portions. This Court suggests therefore that the authorization in the Spill Act for expenditures, beyond the State's share, for remedial costs for sites on the NPL and for removal costs that are eligible for superfund compensation under the terms of the NCP, should be severed.

Having found that the preempted/non-preempted provisions of the Spill Act may be severed, the question of refunds will now be addressed.

V. HAVE PLAINTIFFS COMPLIED WITH ALL JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS SO AS TO ENTITLE THEM TO CLAIM REFUNDS OF SPILL ACT TAXES?

N.J.S.A. 54:49-14 of the State Tax Uniform Procedure Law, provides:

Any taxpayer, at any time within two years after the payment of any original or additional tax assessed against him, unless a shorter limit is fixed by the law imposing the tax, may file with the commissioner a claim under oath for refund, in such form as the commissioner may prescribe, stating the grounds therefore, but no claim for refund shall be required or permitted to be filed with respect to a tax paid, after protest has been filed with the commissioner or after proceedings on appeal have been

commenced as provided in this subtitle, until such protest or appeal has been finally determined.

As it pertains to this issue the procedural history of this matter is as follows. On August 10, 1981, plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Tax Court seeking to have the Spill Tax declared unconstitutional and to obtain a refund for all taxes which were being paid. On April 23, 1982 the Tax Court granted the State's motion for summary judgment and dismissed all counts of plaintiffs' complaint which related to the constitutionality of the Spill Act. This decision was affirmed by the Appellate Division and by the New Jersey Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the New Jersey Supreme Court which in turn remanded the matter to the Tax Court.

In early 1983, during the pendency of these lawsuits, plaintiffs filed claims for refund with the New Jersey Division of Taxation, which were denied by the Director of the Division. Each plaintiff filed a timely appeal in the Tax Court from denial of the claim for refund. No subsequent refund claims appear to have been filed. Since plaintiffs' 1983 refund claims cover only the periods stated in the claims, defendants contend that there are subsequent periods for which no refund claims were filed and which are now barred by the two-year statute of limitations contained in *N.J.S.A. 54:49-14*.

In a letter to the presiding judge of the Tax Court dated June 2, 1983, defendants presented the parties' joint request to place each of the appeals filed in 1983 on the inactive list pending the final disposition of the Tax Court decision. The issues raised were identical to those presented in the refund appeals, i.e. whether the Spill Act was preempted by CERCLA. These cases were placed on the inactive list where they still remain. Plaintiffs also claim that during an April 1986 conference with the presiding judge of the Tax Court, defendants

represented that plaintiffs had complied with all procedural requirements and that that was not an issue.⁹

In their brief in opposition to plaintiffs' motion for injunctive relief, dated September 8, 1986, defendants for the first time formally asserted that plaintiffs had failed to comply with all of the procedural requirements concerning their refund claims.¹⁰ In a letter to plaintiffs' counsel dated September 10, 1986, the Division of Taxation notified plaintiffs concerning the alleged procedural deficiencies in the claims for refund and denied all refund claims.

Essentially plaintiffs claim that the refund statute language permits the filing of a single set of claims covering all subsequent periods. Plaintiffs argue that the phrase in *N.J.S.A. 54:49-14*, "but no claim for refund shall be required or permitted to be filed with respect to a tax paid, after protest has been filed with the Commissioner or after proceedings on appeal have been commenced as provided in this subtitle, until such protest or appeal has been finally determined," means that once a claim for refund is filed for a given two-year period, no other claims are required or permitted until the matter in controversy in the first refund claim is finally resolved.

Plaintiffs' interpretation overlooks the fact that each taxable period is viewed as separate and distinct from all other periods for purposes of compliance with jurisdictional requirements in tax matters. Jurisdiction to re-

⁹ Defendants neither admit nor deny making such representation but claim that such a statement during an informal, off-the-record conference, cannot be binding.

The Court notes that in their April 1986 non-binding statements regarding legal issues, no reference was made to plaintiffs' alleged failure to abide by the requirements of *N.J.S.A. 54:49-14*.

¹⁰ In an earlier brief defendants alluded to the possible existence of such procedural defects.

view one taxable year is not determinative of jurisdiction over other years. See *Clairol, Inc. v. Kingsley*, 109 N.J. Super. 22, 25 (App. Div. 1980), aff'd. o.b., 57 N.J. 199 (1970), app. dismissed. 402 U.S. 902 (1971); *Fairmount Cemetery Ass'n. v. Newark*, 3 N.J. Tax 370, 374 (Tax Court 1981). Construing the refund statute as plaintiffs would have it would completely subvert the principle that in tax matters jurisdictional requirements, specifically statutes of limitations, must be met for each taxable period.

Notwithstanding that conclusion I nevertheless find that plaintiffs are entitled to seek refunds, (from the NCP and NPL dates set forth in Point III). Although couched in terms of a "tax" refund, in view of the United States Supreme Court's finding that it was not the imposition and collection of the Spill Tax, but rather the expenditure of some of the monies on preempted purposes, that was improper, plaintiffs actually seek a return of those improperly spent funds. As such, N.J.S.A. 54:49-14 does not apply.¹¹ Defendants do not disagree with the Supreme Court's finding. Defendants cannot have it both ways. They cannot adopt the "no tax" argument when it suits their needs in support of their position regarding prospectivity and severability, and adopt a "yes tax" position in an attempt to defeat plaintiffs' claims for refunds.

Secondly, notwithstanding defendants' claims that had they known the United States Supreme Court's decision regarding preemption beforehand, they would have devoted the preempted funds to non-preempted purposes, the fact is, as noted earlier, that some monies were expended on preempted purposes. But for those expenditures, it clearly appears that, with the continued pay-

¹¹ In spite of this finding it was deemed wise to include the foregoing discussion concerning the interpretation of the requirements of N.J.S.A. 54:49-14 in the event the Supreme Court disagrees with this finding and concludes that the statute does apply.

ments of the tax by plaintiffs, the statutory cap, (*N.J.S.A.* 58:10-23.11h(b)) would have been reached and the subsequent payments would never have been made. Under those circumstances defendants should not be permitted to take refuge behind the procedural requirements of *N.J.S.A.* 54:49-14.

Lastly, if ever there was a situation where fundamental fairness should allow a party to at least pursue a refund claim, this is it.

VI. IN WHAT MANNER SHALL PLAINTIFFS BE REFUNDED THOSE SUMS EXPENDED ON PREEMPTED PURPOSES?

Initially, defendants argue that plaintiffs are entitled to no refund because they cannot prove that they would have been assessed less tax, or no tax at all, but for the preempted provisions of the Spill Act; that is, they cannot show that all of the taxes would not have been spent for non-preempted purposes if the Supreme Court's decision had been available earlier. Thus plaintiffs cannot show that they suffered any harm from the constitutional defects in the Spill Act. Defendants argue that the hazardous substance discharge problem in New Jersey is of sufficient scope to justify expenditure of *all* Spill Tax revenues collected to date. That some of those monies may have been spent for preempted purposes can be viewed as an historical accident resulting from the State's reasonable reliance on its interpretation of the law. Had the law been clear, according to defendants, there is no doubt that all of the Spill Tax revenues would have been used for non-preempted purposes. Accordingly defendants contend that plaintiffs have suffered no specific financial harm and are entitled to no financial remedy. In sum, defendants claim that the equities favor them since the plaintiffs would have paid the full amount of taxes even if preempted spending had not been made. They claim that if they had known that preemption would

have been ultimately declared, they would have spent the money on other things. The simple answer, as previously noted, is that they did not do this. Preemption has been declared; taxpayers' money was spent for preempted purposes; and those taxpayers are presumably entitled to a measure of relief.

As previously noted § 114(c) of CERCLA states that a special tax cannot be collected for certain uses; it does not preclude the collection of the tax for *valid* uses nor does it prohibit general revenues or other monies from being spent for preempted uses. Accordingly had the high court found that it was the *collection* of the tax that was improper, this Court should direct repayment of the taxes to the taxpayers in the same proportion as the taxes were paid. However it was the *expenditure* for preempted purposes that was found to be improper. If that preempted spending had not occurred, (it did) and if those monies were spent on non-preempted purposes, (they were not), as earlier noted, it appears that the amount of money paid into spill fund would have exceeded the \$35,000,000 cap set by the Legislature and the tax would have been suspended on its own accord. *N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11h(b)*.

Because it was the expenditure for preempted purposes that was improper, the court should allow defendants the opportunity to compute the amount of those expenditures paid for work performed and material purchased after promulgation of the NCP (July 16, 1982) and the NPL (September 8, 1983). Such task, as noted earlier, will be difficult. Possibly a hearing may have to be conducted to determine the amount in question. Thereafter the Legislature should be permitted a reasonable period of time to reimburse the spill fund for the amount of preempted expenditures made.¹² Reimbursement will make

¹² As previously noted general revenues may be devoted to preempted uses. Similarly the State is free to recover these expendi-

plaintiffs whole because the constitutional infirmity and plaintiffs' financial harm resulted from the improper *expenditure* of spill fund revenues and not the *collection* of the tax per se. Reimbursement cures the improper depletion of the fund because all of these monies collected will again be in the fund for future commitment to proper uses. Plaintiffs will not have suffered any economic harm once the spill fund has been reimbursed and thus will be entitled to no refund.

Failure to make timely reimbursement should entitle plaintiffs to a refund of the improperly expended amounts. Any excess in the fund resulting from such reimbursement should also be refunded. In either event the refund to the individual plaintiffs should be in proportion to the tax each paid to the total tax collected.

VII. SHOULD PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO ENJOIN DEFENDANTS FROM ENFORCING COLLECTION OF THE SPILL TAX BE GRANTED?

In their original complaints to the Tax Court, plaintiffs sought, *inter alia*, an injunction restraining defendants from attempting to enforce the collection of taxes under the Spill Act. The United States Supreme Court has ruled on the merits of the case and declared that to the extent the Spill Act permits taxation to support preempted expenditures it cannot stand. Accordingly plaintiffs argue that to continue to impose the Spill Tax at the rate established to support the cleanup of all hazardous waste sites, including preempted superfund sites, is in clear violation of § 114(c) and the mandate issued by the Supreme Court. Citing *Keuper v. Wilson*, 111 N.J. Super. 502, 505-06 (Ch. Div. 1970), plaintiffs argue that where there has been a prior adjudication that the State

tures from the responsible parties. N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11g(c). Possibly any balance of the \$100,000,000 bond issue for hazardous waste cleanup, P.L. 1981, c. 175, may be used to replenish the fund.

has violated plaintiffs' rights, the acts of State officials in contravention of such adjudication should be enjoined.

The fundamental error in plaintiffs' position, both as expressed in their request for injunctive relief and in this remand proceeding generally, is that the United States Supreme Court, contrary to plaintiffs' belief, did not strike down the spill fund tax *per se* but only to the extent that tax monies were expended for preempted purposes. Thus, if plaintiffs' tax monies are being spent for non-preempted purposes, which defendants allege is, and has been the case, since the date of the Supreme Court's opinion, plaintiffs have no cause to complain and must continue to pay the tax. While plaintiffs are free to disagree with this view, their recourse is not injunctive relief.

Furthermore plaintiffs are adequately protected against any irreparable harm. Irreparable harm sufficient to entitle an applicant to either temporary or permanent injunctive relief is a harm that cannot be adequately redressed by monetary damages. *Crowe v. DeGioia*, 90 N.J. 126, 132-3 (1982) (stating standard to obtain temporary injunction); *Board of Ed. of Union Beach v. N.J. Ed. Ass'n.*, 96 N.J.Super. 371 (Ch. Div. 1967), *aff'd*, 53 N.J. 29 (1968) (stating standard for permanent injunctive relief). Since the harm which plaintiffs will have allegedly suffered is the improper expenditure of legal tax monies, that harm can be redressed by repaying such monies in the form of refunds or reimbursement to the fund as the case may be. Plaintiffs' harm is thus purely pecuniary and not irreparable.

Moreover, for an applicant to obtain either temporary or permanent injunctive relief, the court must be at least somewhat persuaded of the correctness of the applicant's claim. Until a determination is made as to the monies expended for work and materials after the NCP and NPL triggering dates, the Court is not persuaded in favor of either party's chance of success.

Finally, when the relative hardships to the parties are considered, it is apparent that plaintiffs do not meet the test. Plaintiffs are clearly able to pay current spill fund tax assessments. On the other hand, the State needs plaintiffs' spill fund tax monies to fully fund its vast cleanup operations which have not been preempted by CERCLA (see Catania Affid. par. 2 to 5). Moreover, should plaintiffs prevail the State will abide by that final judicial decision, and a permanent injunction will be unnecessary.

An injunction should not issue.

SUMMARY

Pursuant to the Supreme Court's remand, the undersigned submits the following recommendations.

1. The decision of the United States Supreme Court should not be applied prospectively but should be retroactive to July 16, 1982 with respect to expenditures made on preempted removal purposes and to September 8, 1983 as to preempted remedial expenses.

2. The non-preempted purposes of the Spill Act are severable from the purposes found to be preempted by the United States Supreme Court.

3. Plaintiffs' claims for refunds should not be defeated by reason of their failure to comply with the procedural requirements of *N.J.S.A.* 54:49-14.

4. Following an accounting, (and plenary hearing if necessary) to determine the amount of monies paid for material purchased and services rendered for preempted removal purposes on or after July 16, 1982 and for preempted remedial purposes on or after September 8, 1983 to March 10, 1986, (date of the United States Supreme Court decision), the Legislature should be permitted a reasonable period of time to reimburse the fund for the preempted amounts expended.

(a) If, following such reimbursement, the amount of the fund exceeds the cap established by the Legislature, such excess should be paid to plaintiffs.

(b) Should the required reimbursement not be made, the amount of preempted expenditures should be refunded to plaintiffs.

(c) Such refunds should be made in proportion to the tax paid by each plaintiff to the total tax collected.

5. Defendants should not be enjoined from enforcing payment of the spill fund tax by plaintiffs.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ John F. Evers
JOHN F. EVERS, J.T.C.

/cf

Oct. 24, 1986

APPENDIX C

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
September Term 1984

A-66

EXXON CORPORATION, *et al.*,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ROBERT HUNT, ADMINISTRATOR OF
NEW JERSEY SPILL COMPENSATION FUND, *et al.*,
Defendants-Respondents.

[Filed Apr. 3, 1986]

ORDER

This matter having been remanded to this Court by the Supreme Court of the United States for further proceedings consistent with its mandate, and good cause appearing;

It is ORDERED that this matter is hereby remanded to the Tax Court to develop a record and make such recommended findings and calculations as may be determined to be necessary to implement the mandate of the Supreme Court; and it is further

ORDERED that report of the Tax Court shall be filed with the Clerk of this Court within 60 days of the filing date this Order.

Jurisdiction over this matter is otherwise retained.

WITNESS, the Honorable Robert L. Clifford, Presiding Justice, at Trenton, this 1st day of April, 1986.

/s/ Stephen W. Townsend
Clerk of the Supreme Court

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ss:

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

To the Honorable the Justices
of the Supreme Court of
New Jersey,

GREETINGS:

WHEREAS, lately in the Supreme Court of New Jersey, there came before you a cause between Exxon Corporation, The BF Goodrich Company, Union Carbide Corporation, Monsanto Company and Tenneco Chemicals, Inc., Plaintiffs-Appellants, and Robert Hunt, Administrator of New Jersey Spill Compensation Fund; Clifford A. Goldman, Treasurer of the State of New Jersey; Sidney Glaser, Director of the Division of Taxation, Jerry F. English, Commissioner of Environmental Protection, and the State of New Jersey, Defendants-Respondents, No. 21,567, wherein the judgment of the said Supreme Court was duly entered on the nineteenth day of September, 1984, as appears by an inspection of the transcript of the record from the said Supreme Court which was brought into the SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES as provided by Act of Congress.

AND WHEREAS, in the 1985 Term, the said cause came on to be heard before the SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES on the said transcript of record and was argued by counsel.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it was ordered and adjudged on March 10, 1986, by this Court that the judgment of the above court in this cause is affirmed in part and reversed in part, with one-half of the total costs to be taxed against the appellees therein, and that this cause is remanded to the Supreme Court of New Jersey

for further proceedings not inconsistent with the opinion of this Court.

IT WAS FURTHER ORDERED that the appellants, Exxon Corporation, et al., recover from Robert Hunt, Administrator of New Jersey Spill Compensation Fund, et al. One Thousand Five Dollars and Thirty-four Cents (\$1,005.34) for their costs herein expended.

NOW, THEREFORE, THE CAUSE IS REMANDED to you in order that such proceedings may be had in the said cause, in conformity with the judgment of this Court above stated, as accord with right and justice, and the Constitution and Laws of the United States.

Witness the Honorable WARREN E. BURGER, Chief Justice of the United States, the 9th day of April in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and eighty-six.

Costs of Exxon Corporation, et al.

Printing of record:	\$1,710.68
Clerk's costs:	300.00
TOTAL:	<u>\$2,010.68</u>

/s/ Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr.
JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR.

Clerk of the Supreme Court of the
United States

No. 84-978

Exxon Corporation, et al.

v.

Robert Hunt, Administrator of New Jersey Spill
Compensation Fund, et al.

APPENDIX E

EXXON CORPORATION
Affiliates and Subsidiaries
(Not Wholly-Owned)*

Abu Dhabi Petroleum Company Limited
 Ace Polymer Co., Ltd.
 Aditivos Orinoco, C. A.
 Adria-Wien Pipeline Gesellschaft mit beschränkter
 Haftung
 Aircraft Fuel Supply B. V.
 Aishin Sekiyu K. K.
 Alberta Products Pipe Line Ltd.
 Al-Jubail Petrochemical Company
 Altona Petrochemical Company Limited
 Alyeska Pipeline Service Company
 Andian National Corporation, Limited
 Arabian American Oil Company
 Aramco Overseas Company
 Aramco Services Company
 Asakawa Sekiyu K. K.
 Asociacion Civil "Academy La Castellana"
 Atlas Supply Company
 Atlas Supply Company of Canada Limited
 Australian Synthetic Rubber Company Limited
 Aviation Services Saudi Arabia Limited
 Awaji Gas Nenryo Kabushiki Kaisha
 Azuma Sekiyu K. K.
 BEB Erdgas und Erdöl GmbH, Hannover
 BT Asia Securities Limited
 B.W.O.C., Inc.
 Bangkok Aviation Fuel Services Limited
 Banshu Ekika Gas K. K.
 Bayerische Erdgasleitung G.m.b.H.
 Beaverhill Resources Limited
 Bel-Air Entreposage S. A.

* Does not include companies with less than 5% Exxon Ownership.

BRIGITTA Erdgas und Erdol GmbH, Hannover
 Bryan Woodbine Gathering Inc.
 Byron Creek Collieries (1983) Limited
 Carlew Inc.
 Carnduff Gas Limited
 Cary Chemicals Inc.
 Castle Peak Power Company Limited
 Champlain Oil Products Limited
 Changi Airport Fuel Hydrant Installation Pte. Ltd.
 Chuo Sekiyu Hanbai K. K.
 Commercial Polymers Pty. Ltd.
 Compagnie d'Etancheite Africaine en Cote d'Ivoire S. A.
 Compania Minera Disputada de Las Condes S. A.
 Comptoir Auxiliaire du Petrole
 Comptoir Oxonnaxien des Combustibles (C.O.C.)
 Computer Centrum Groningen B.V.
 DFTG Deutsche Flussigerdgas Terminal GmbH
 Daihatsu Sekiyu K. K.
 Daiichi Kouyu K. K.
 Demulsificantes Del Orinoco, C. A.
 Depot Petrolier du Gresivaudan
 Depots de Petrole Cotiers
 Depots Petrolier de la Corse
 Deudan-Holding GmbH
 Deutsche Erdgas Transport G.m.b.H.
 Deutsche Transalpine Oelleitung G.m.b.H.
 Devon Estates Limited
 Dixie Pipeline Company
 Dukhan Service Company
 E S F Limited
 Eagle Kenso K. K.
 East Japan Oil Development Company, Limited
 East Texas Salt Water Disposal Company
 Eastcoast Spill Response Inc.
 Eiko Sekiyu K.K.
 Elwerath Erdgas und Erdol GmbH, Hannover
 Elwerath Erdol und Erdgas AG
 Emirates Chemicals Company

Emori Sekiyu K.K.
 Emsland-Erdolleitung G.m.b.H.
 Energie Marketing Service GmbH (EMS)
 Entrepot Petrolier de l'Aveyron (E.P.A.)
 Entrepot Petrolier de Mulhouse (E.P.M.)
 Erdgas-Verkaufs-Gesellschaft m.b.H.
 Escuela Las Morochas, C. A.
 Esso Chemical Alberta Limited
 Esso Energie G.I.E.
 Esso Exploration and Production Angola Inc.
 Esso Malaysia Berhad
 Esso of Canada Limited
 Esso Resources Canada Limited
 Esso Societe Anonyme Francaise
 Esso Standard Tunisie S. A.
 Etablissements Cloarec
 Exact Reisebyra A/S
 Exxon Chemical Pakistan Limited
 489061 Ontario Inc.
 F. T. Giken Kabushiki Kaisha
 Federated Pipe Lines Ltd.
 Ferngas Nordbayern G.m.b.H.
 Ferngas Salzgitter GmbH
 Forjas de Colombia, S. A.
 Fuji Kogyo K.K.
 Gasunie Engineering B.V.
 General Bussan K.K.
 General Highway K.K.
 General Petrochemical Industries Limited
 General Sekiyu K.K.
 General Sekiyu Okinawa Hanbai K.K.
 General Sekiyu Overseas Ltd.
 General Shipping Co. Ltd.
 General Unyu Kabushiki Kaisha
 Geobutane-Lavera
 Gewerkschaft Brassert Erdol und Erdgas GmbH
 Gewerkschaft Elwerath & Co. GmbH.
 Gewerkschaft Erdol-Raffinerie Deurag-Nerag
 Gewerkschaft Gute Hoffnung Erdgas und Erdol GmbH

Gewerkschaft Kuchenberg Erdgas under Erdol GmbH
 Goroku Sekiyu K.K.
 Grande Ecaille Land Company, Inc.
 Groupement Immobilier Petrolier
 Groupement Petrolier Aviation
 Groupement Petrolier de la Cote D'Azur
 Groupement Petrolier de Nantes
 Groupement Petrolier du Finistere G.I.E.
 Groupement pour l'Etude d'un Pipeline
 Bordeaux Toulouse
 Hannoversche Erdolleitung G.m.b.H.
 Hanshin Kyowa Sekiyu K.K.
 Hayakawa Sekiyu K.K.
 Heinrich Schneider Spedition GmbH
 Hiroshima General Gas Juten Kabushiki Kaisha
 Hoei Sekiyu K.K.
 Hokushin Bussan K.K.
 Hokuyu Sekiyu K. K.
 Home Energy Company Ltd.
 Home Oil Company Limited
 Houston Regional Monitoring Corporation
 Hydranten-Betriebsgesellschaft
 Hydrierwerke Poelitz Aktiengesellschaft
 Imperial Oil Limited
 Imperial Pipe Line Company, Limited, The
 Inada Ekka Gas Kabushiki Kaisha
 Industry Promotion Enterprises Limited
 Interprovincial Pipe Line (Alberta) Ltd.
 Interprovincial Pipe Line Limited
 Interprovincial Pipe Line (NW) Ltd.
 Iranian Oil Participants Limited
 Iranian Oil Services (Holdings) Limited
 Iranian Oil Services Limited
 Iraq Petroleum Company, Limited
 Iraq Petroleum Pensions, Limited
 Japan Butyl Company Limited
 Japan Coal Liquefaction Development Company, Ltd.
 Jersey Nuclear-Avco Isotopes, Inc.

K.K. Aizu General
 K.K. Daimaru
 K.K. General Sekiyu Hanbaisho
 K.K. Genetech
 K.K. Heian Sekiyu
 K.K. Kanagawa Sekiyu Shokai
 K.K. Kyoei Shosha
 K.K. Kyowa Sekiyu Service
 K.K. Marugo Izumasa Shoten
 K.K. Nippatsu
 K.K. Standard Sekiyu Osaka Hatsubaisho
 K.K. Toresen
 K.K. Uwano Sekiyu Shokai
 K/S Statfjord Transport A/S & Co.
 Kabushiki Kaisha Sankyo Plastics
 Kai Tak Refuellers Company Limited
 Kanto Kygnus Sekiyu Hambai K.K.
 Karlsruhe-Stuttgart Rohrleitung Gesellschaft mbH
 Kawasaki Kygnus Sekiyu Hambai Kabushiki Kaisha
 Keiyo Sekiyu Hanbai K.K.
 Kenya Petroleum Refineries Limited
 Kibo Sekiyu Hanbai K.K.
 Kimura Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha
 Kinwa Sekiyu K.K.
 Kobe Port Service Kabushiki Kaisha
 Kobe Standard Sekiyu K. K.
 Kowa Sekiyu K.K.
 Kowloon Electricity Supply Company Limited
 Kygnus Ekka Gas Kabushiki Kaisha
 Kygnus Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha
 Kygnus Marketing Service K.K.
 Kygnus Sekiyu K. K.
 Kyushu Eagle K.K.
 LPL Investments, Inc.
 Lakehead Pipe Line Company, Inc.
 LEAG Aktiengesellschaft fur luzernisches Erdol
 Les Docks des Petroles d'Ambes
 Long Beach Oil Development Company
 Maasvlakte Olie Terminal N.V.

Maasvlakte Coal Terminal B.V.
 Magota Sekiyu K.K.
 Mainline Pipelines Limited
 Maple Leaf Petroleum Limited
 Maquinas de Coser y Bordar Sigma, S. A.
 Marugo Gas K.K.
 MEGAL FINCO
 MEGAL GmbH
 Meiji Sekiyu K.K.
 MESBIC Financial Corporation of Houston
 Metro Fuel Co. Ltd.
 Mikawa Bussan K.K.
 Minerals Limited
 Mittelrheinische Erdgas Transport Gesellschaft
 mit beschränkter Haftung
 Montreal Pipe Line Limited/Les Pipe-Lines
 Montreal Limitee
 Mytex Polymers Incorporated
 NAM—K 7 B.V.
 NAM—K 14 B.V.
 NAM—K 15 B.V.
 NAM/CLOMS—K 8/K 11 B.V.
 NAM/CLOMS—L 13 B.V.
 N. V. Nederlandse Gasunie
 NPC Services, Inc.
 Nakabayashi Sekiyu K.K.
 Nansei Oil Terminal K.K.
 Nansei Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha
 Native Venture Capital Co. Ltd.
 Near East Development Corporation
 Nederlandse Aardolie Maatschappij B. V.
 Neptune Bulk Terminals (Canada) Ltd.
 Nichimo Oil (Bermuda) Co., Ltd.
 Nichimo Sekiyu Seisei Kabushiki Kaisha
 Nikko Sangyo K.K.
 Nippon Unicar K.K.
 Nisku Products Pipe Line Company Limited
 Nissei Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha

Norddeutsche Erdgas-Aufbereitungs G.m.b.H.
 Norddeutsche Mineraloelwerke Stettin G.m.b.H.
 Norddeutsche Oelleitungs-gesellschaft m.b.H.
 Nordrheinische Erdgas Transport Gesellschaft
 mit beschränkter Haftung
 Nord-West Oelleitung G.m.b.H.
 Northward Developments Ltd.
 Northwest Company, Limited
 Nottingham Gas Limited
 107580 Canada Inc.
 139675 Canada Limited
 151742 Canada Inc.
 158585 Canada Limited
 159129 Canada Inc.
 Office Prive d'Assurances et de Courtages
 Offshore Medical Support Limited
 Oil Field Chemicals Company (Saudi Arabia) Ltd.
 Oil Service Company of Iran (Private Company)
 Oil Spill Response Limited
 Oil Transport Company (Saudi Arabia) Limited
 Oldenburgische Erdol Gesellschaft m.b.H.
 Osaka Ashyu Nenryou K.K.
 Osaka Propane Gas Hambai Kabushiki Kaisha
 Osaka Sekiyu Gas Yuso K. K.
 P.A.C. S.A.R.L. (Pinson Allegret-Causse)
 P. T. Stanvac Indonesia
 Pars Investment Corporation
 Peninsula Electric Power Company Limited
 Petroleum Refineries (Australia) Proprietary Limited
 Petroleum Services (Middle East) Limited
 Petrosvibri S.A.
 Pinpoint Retail Systems Inc.
 Pipe Line Services, Inc.
 Plantation Pipe Line Company
 Polder-Seehafen-Harburg GmbH
 Portland Pipe Line Corporation
 Primaer Oel GmbH
 Progas A/S

Raffinerie du Midi S.A.R.L.
 Rainbow Pipe Line Company, Ltd.
 Redwater Water Disposal Company Limited
 Refineria Petrolera Acajutla, S. A.
 Rheingas Erdgasleitungs-Gesellschaft m.b.H.
 Rochevert Inc.
 Rotterdam Antwerpen Pijpleiding (Belgie)
 Rotterdam-Antwerpen Pijpleiding (Nederland) N.V.
 Ruhrgas Aktiengesellschaft
 S.A. du Pipeline a Produits Petroliers sur
 Territoire Genevois (SAPPRO)
 S.A.R.L. Viain
 SEAG Aktiengesellschaft fur schweizerisches Erdol
 S.O.P.—Societa Oleodotti Padani S. p. A.
 Saitama Sekiyu Hanbai K.K.
 Sakurajima Futo K.K.
 Sanko Oil Kabushiki Kaisha
 Sanyo Sekiyu K.K.
 Saraco S. A.
 Saudi Arabian Lube Additives Company Limited
 Schubert KG
 Scurry-Rainbow Oil Limited
 Seibu Kygnus Sekiyu Hambai Kabushiki Kaisha
 Seismic Industries A/S
 Senpoku Oil Service K.K.
 SERAM Societa per Azioni
 Servacar Ltd.
 Shehtah Drilling Limited
 Shimoka Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha
 Shimoyama Sekiyu K.K.
 Shin-Nihon Yukagaku Kogyo K. K.
 Shinohara Oil K.K.
 Shizuoka Kanesho Hambai Kabushiki Kaisha
 Smiley Gas Conservation Limited
 Sociedad Anonima "Escuela Campo Alegre"
 Sociedad de Inversiones de Aviacion
 Sociedad Nacional de Oleoductos Ltda.
 Societa Italiana per l'Oleodotto Transalpino S.p.A.

Societa per Azioni Raffineria Padana
 Olii Minerali-SARPOM
 Societe Anonyme de la Raffinerie des Antilles
 Societe Anonyme des Hydrocarbures
 Societe Anonyme "Produits Lubrifiants de
 Madagascar"—PROLUMA S.A.
 Societe Belge de Transport par Pipeline
 Societe Civile de Mustapha Algerie
 Societe Civile de Participation pour la
 Destruction des Dechets Industriels (SOCDI)
 Societe Civile Immobiliere "Courcelles-Etoile"
 Societe Civile Immobiliere de la Croix au Chene
 Societe Civile Immobiliere du 195 Avenue de Neuilly
 Societe Civile Immobiliere Khariessa
 Societe Civile Immobiliere "Kleber-Etoile"
 Societe Civile Immobiliere "Les Casseaux-Bougainville"
 Societe de la Raffinerie d' Alger
 Societe de la Raffinerie de Lorraine
 Societe de Manutention de Carburants Aviation
 Societe de Manutention de Carburants Aviation
 Daker-Yoff, S. A.
 Societe de Promotion et de Financement Touristique
 (CARTHAGO)
 Societe d'Entreposage de San-Pedro
 Societe des Pipe-Lines de Strasbourg
 Societe des Transports Petroliers par Pipe Line
 Societe d'Exploitation & de Developpement
 d'Operations Commerciales
 Societe du Caoutchouc-Butyl (SOCABU)
 Societe du Pipe Line de la Raffinerie de Lorraine
 Societe du Pipe-Line Mediterranee-Rhone
 Societe du Pipeline Sud-Europeen
 Societe Esso de Recherches et d'Exploitation
 Petrolieres Esso Rep
 Societe Francaise Exxon Chemical
 Societe "Geomines-Caen"
 Societe Havraise de Manutention de Produits Petroliers
 Societe Hoteliere de la Petite Campagne

Societe Immobiliere Paris-Niel
 Societe Ivoirienne d'Operations Petrolieres S.A.
 Societe Malgache de Raffinage
 Societe Reunionnaise d'Entreposage
 Socony-Standard-Vacuum Oil Company
 (Petroleum Maatschappij)
 Southern Natural Gas Development Pty. Ltd.
 Standard Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha
 Standard Service K.K.
 Statfjord Transport A/S
 Stockage Geologique de Gaz de Lavera
 Suddeutsche Erdgas Transport Gesellschaft
 mit beschränkter Haftung
 Sulbath Exploration Ltd.
 Sun East Company Ltd.
 Supertex, Inc.
 Sydis, Inc.
 Syncrude Canada Ltd.
 Synergistics Industries Limited
 System Plaza Kabushiki Kaisha
 TAR-Tankanlage Rumlang AG
 TBN Tanklager-Betriebsgesellschaft Nurnberg mbH
 Taglu Enterprises Ltd.
 Taihei Bussan K.K.
 Taiko Sekiyu K.K.
 Taisei Kogyo Sekiyu Hanbai K.K.
 Takahama Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha
 Taketsuru Yugyo K.K.
 Tanaka Sekiyu Hanbai K.K.
 Tankanlage A. G., Mellingen
 Tanklager Altishausen A. G.
 Tanklager Gesellschaft, Koln
 Tanklager-Gesellschaft Tegel
 Tanklager Lechelles I S.A.
 Tanklager Taegerschen AG
 Tecnica Quimica Petrolera, S.A. de C. V.
 Tecumseh Gas Storage Limited
 THUMS Long Beach Company

Thyssengas G.m.b.H.
TIBA Speditionen GmbH
Toa Nenryo Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha
Tohko Plastics Company, Limited
Tohpren Co. Ltd.
Toko Sekiyu K.K.
Tonen Energy International Corp.
Tonen Maintenance K.K.
Tonen Sekiyukagaku Kabushiki Kaisha
Tonen Tanker Kabushiki Kaisha
Tonen Technology K. K.
Towa Compounding Co. Ltd.
Towa Sekiyu K.K.
Toyoshina Film Company, Ltd.
Trans-Arabian Pipe Line Company
Transalpine Oelleitung in Oesterreich Gesellschaft m.b.H.
Transgaz Lavera
Tsurumaru Unyu K.K.
Turkish Petroleum Company, Limited
UBAG—Unterflurbetankungsanlage Flughafen Zurich
Van Salt Water Disposal Company
W.A.G. Pipeline Proprietary Limited
Wako Jushi Kabushiki Kaisha
Wako Kasei Kabushiki Kaisha
Wartempomp Nederland B.V.
Westdeutsche Erdolleitungen-G.m.b.H.
Westgas G.m.b.H.
Westgastransport B.V.
Winnipeg Pipe Line Company Limited
Wohnungsbaugesellschaft, Steimbke-Rodewald G.m.b.H.
Worex et Cie
Yasaka Sekiyu K.K.
Yellowstone Pipe Line Company
Yoshiki Sekiyu Kabushiki Kaisha
Yoshimi Gas Kabushiki Kaisha
Yuai Sekiyu K.K.
Yugen Kaisha Nishi Kobe Bosai Center

THE BF GOODRICH COMPANY**Affiliates and Subsidiaries
(Not Wholly-Owned)**

BFGoodrich Australia Limited
 BFGoodrich Chemical de Venezuela, C.A.
 Japan Power Brake, Inc.
 PABCO Holdings Pty. Limited (Australia)
 Polycyd, S.A. de C.V. (Mexico)
 The Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Company

UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION**Affiliates and Subsidiaries
(Not Wholly-Owned)**

ACM Services, Inc.
 Focus Homecare, Inc.
 Greenwich Oil Corporation
 Kemet Electronics Corp.
 Miami Welding Supply, Inc.
 Tenngasco Gas Gathering Company
 United States Welding, Inc.
 Union Carbide Canada Limited
 Chemos Industries Pty. Limited (Australia)
 Union Carbide Australia Limited
 Union Carbide India Limited
 Nippon Unicar Company Limited (Japan)
 Union Showa K.K. (Japan)
 Union Gas Company Limited (Korea)
 Union Polymers Sdn. Bhd. (Malaysia)
 Union Carbide New Zealand Limited
 Indugas N.V. (Belgium)
 Calida Gas N.V. (Belgium)
 Argon, S.A. (Spain)
 S.A. White Martins (Brazil)
 S.A. White Martins Nordeste (Brazil)
 Union Carbide Mexicana, S.A. de C.V. (Mexico)
 Electrode Maatskappy Van Suid Afrika (Eiendoms)
 Beperk (Republic of South Africa)

Beralt Tin and Wolfram Limited (U.K.)
 Carbografite Limited (Republic of South Africa)
 IGI-Italiana Gas Industriali S.p.A. (Italy)
 Iwatani Industrial Gases Corporation (Japan)
 SIAD-Societa Italiana Acetilene e Derivate S.p.A. (Italy)
 Unigas S.p.A. (Italy)
 Union Carbide Argentina S.A.I.C.S. (Argentina)
 Union Carbide Australia and New Zealand Limited
 (Australia)
 Union Carbide Pakistan Limited (Pakistan)

MONSANTO COMPANY
Affiliates and Subsidiaries
(Not Wholly-Owned)

ACM Services, Inc.
 Advance Textile Mills (Durham) Ltd.
 Advance Throwing Mills Limited
 Advent Eurofund Limited
 Advent-Techno Venture Investment Corp. N.V.
 Australian Flourine Chemicals Pty. Limited (AFC)
 Australian Petrochemicals Limited (APL)
 Companhia Brasileira de Estireno (CBE)
 Continental Pharma, Inc.
 EXAC Corporation
 EXAC Research and Development Corporation
 Farris Engineering Ltd.
 Fisher Century Engineering Limited
 Fisher Controles de Mexico, S.A. de C.V.
 Fisher Controles do Brasil Ltda.
 Fisher Controls A.G.
 Fisher Controls, B.V.
 Fisher Controls Company of Canada Limited
 Fisher Controls Ges.m.b.H.
 Fisher Controls GmbH
 Fisher Controls Hong Kong Limited
 Fisher Controls Industria e Comercio Ltda.
 Fisher Controls Installation & Service Company
 Fisher Controls (Instrumentation) Ltd.

Fisher Controls International, Inc.
 Fisher Controls Limited
 Fisher Controls Pte. Ltd.
 Fisher Controls Pty. Limited
 Fisher Controls, S.A. (France)
 Fisher Controls, S.A. (Spain)
 Fisher Controls S.A.N.V.
 Fisher Controls South Pacific Ltd.
 Fisher Controls, S.p.A.
 Fisher Controls Trading Company
 Fisher Controls Trustees Limited
 Fisher Governor Company Ltd.
 Fisher Governor Company (Pty.) Limited
 Fisher Governor Nederland B.V.
 Fisher International Control Valves Ltd.
 Fisher Service Company
 Fosbrasil S.A.
 Fovil Manufacturing Company, Inc.
 G. D. Searle Argentina S.A.C.I.
 G. D. Searle G.m.b.H.
 G. D. Searle Unterstutzungskasse G.m.b.H.
 Hartz International Sales Corporation
 HybriTech Seed Europe S.N.C.
 Hydrocarbon Products Pty. Ltd. (HPPL)
 Hydrocarbon Sales Pty. Ltd.
 Industrias Resistol, S.A. (IRSA)
 Invitron Corporation
 Jablo Propellers Limited
 Jacob Hartz Seed Co., Inc.
 Kemp Company
 Kemp Properties, Inc.
 Kinetek Systems Incorporated
 K.K. Astro
 Korag Company Limited
 Korsil Company Limited (KORSIL)
 Kumho Monsanto Inc.
 Leonard Construction Company
 Limewood Run-Off Limited

Maritime Protection A/S

Mitsubishi Monsanto Chemical Company (MMK)

MonGard Ltd.

Monsanto Argicola de Nicaragua (MOAGSA)

Monsanto Argentina S.A.I.C. (MARG)

Monsanto A/S (MODEN)

Monsanto Australia Limited (MAL)

Monsanto Canada Inc. (MOCAN)

Monsanto Centroamerica (El Salvador) S.A.
(MOCASA)

Monsanto Chemical Products Hellas, E.p.E.

Monsanto Chemicals of India Limited (MCIL)

Monsanto Chemicals (Thailand) Limited

Monsanto Chile Comercial e Industrial
Limitada (MOCHILE)

Monsanto Comercial, S.A. de C.V. (MOCSA)

Monsanto (Deutschland) GmbH (MODEUTSCH)

Monsanto do Brasil S.A. (MOBRASA)

Monsanto Electronics Sendirian Berhad (MESB)

Monsanto Enviro-Chem Systems, Inc. (ENVIRO-CHEM)

Monsanto Europe, S.A. (MESA)

Monsanto Export Limited

Monsanto Far East Limited (MOFEL)

Monsanto Fiji Ltd.

Monsanto Finance A.G. (MOFIN)

Monsanto G.m.b.H. (MoAUSTRIA)

Monsanto Guatemala, Inc. (MOGUA)

Monsanto International N.V. (MINV)

Monsanto International Sales Company, Inc.

Monsanto Ireland Ltd.

Monsanto Italiana S.p.A. (MoItaly)

Monsanto Japan Limited (MJL)

Monsanto Korea, Inc.

Monsanto (Malaysia) Sdn. Berhad (MONAYSIA)

Monsanto New Zealand Ltd. (MNZ)

Monsanto Norge A/S (MONORGE)

Monsanto Oil Company of Nigeria


Monsanto Oy

Monsanto Philippines, Inc. (MOPHIL)
 Monsanto p.l.c.
 Monsanto Recreational Products Limited
 Monsanto Research Corporation (MRC)
 Monsanto Services International S.A. (MSI)
 Monsanto Services Ltd.
 Monsanto Singapore Company (Pte) Limited (MOSIN)
 Monsanto South Africa (Proprietary) Limited
 (MOSAF)
 Monsanto (Suisse) S.A. (MOSUISSE)
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 Revertex Industries (Aust.) Pty. Limited
 Revertex Industries (N.Z.) Ltd.
 Revinex Australia Limited
 Ryowa K. K.
 Santuron Praparate G.m.b.H.
 SCI Corporation
 Servicios Especializados Monsanto, S.A. de C.V.
 Sociedade Portuguesa De Desenvolvimento Quimico
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 Societe Monsanto, S.A. (MOFRAN)
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 Sunvic Pty. Limited
 Sunvic Regleranlagen-und-Montagen Ges.m.b.H.
 (Sunvic Austria)
 Sunvic Regler G.m.b.H.
 Tech Equipment Sales Company
 Technologies Associates, Inc.
 Tensometer Limited
 The C.M. Kemp Manufacturing Company
 The Hale Manufacturing Company
 Titan Chemicals Limited
 Tsukuba Service Company, Ltd.
 Zeks Air Dryer Corporation
 Zeks, Inc.

TENNECO RESINS, INC.

Tenneco Resins, Inc. is owned 100% by Tenneco Polymers, Inc., which is owned 100% by Tenneco Corporation, which is owned 100% by Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, which is owned 100% by Tenneco Inc. which is the ultimate holding company. Tenneco Resins, Inc. has no subsidiaries. It does, however, have two affiliate companies, i.e., those which are also owned 100% by Tenneco Polymers, Inc. These are Heyden Newport Chemical Corporation and Tenneco Eastern Realty, Inc.



2
No. 87-1296

Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

MAR 9 1988

JOSEPH F. SPANIOLO,
CLERK

In The
Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1987

— o —
IN RE EXXON CORPORATION,
THE BF GOODRICH COMPANY,
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
MONSANTO COMPANY, and
TENNECO RESINS, INC.,

Petitioners.

— o —
**BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO
THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY**

— o —
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March 1988

QUESTION PRESENTED

Are petitioners entitled to the interlocutory, extraordinary relief of a writ of mandamus where the Supreme Court of New Jersey gave full effect to the mandate of this Court in *Exxon Corp. v. Hunt*, 475 U.S. 355 (1986), and where review of the state court rulings will be available in the normal course once a final judgment is entered?

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Respondents agree with the parties to the proceeding set forth by petitioners, except to note the following changes in the state's executive officers: David Mack is now Acting Administrator of the New Jersey Spill Compensation Fund; Feather O'Connor is now Treasurer of the State of New Jersey; John R. Baldwin is now Director of the Division of Taxation; and Richard Dewling is now Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.

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In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1987

IN RE EXXON CORPORATION,
THE BF GOODRICH COMPANY,
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION,
MONSANTO COMPANY, and
TENNECO RESINS, INC.,

Petitioners.

**BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO
THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY**

The respondents, State of New Jersey, New Jersey executive officers, and Justices of the Supreme Court of New Jersey (including those Judges of the Appellate Division sitting by special designation), respectfully request that this Court deny the instant petition for a writ of mandamus to the Supreme Court of New Jersey.

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE

The petition for the extraordinary writ of mandamus before this Court arises from the December 2, 1987 decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey which found,

pursuant to the remand of this Court ordered in *Exxon Corp. v. Hunt*, 475 U.S. 355, 376 (1986), that as a matter of state law the preempted purposes of the Spill Compensation and Control Act, ("Spill Act"), N.J.S.A. 58:10-23.11 *et seq.*, were severable from the non-preempted purposes. The issue of severability was before the New Jersey Court on remand as a result of this Court's determination that § 114(c) of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 *et seq.*, worked but a *partial preemption* of the permitted uses of the tax money collected under the State Spill Act. *Exxon Corp. v. Hunt*, *supra*, 475 U.S. at 374-376. After deciding the issue of severability, and finding that the tax rate in effect through the period of preemption was supported by the non-preempted uses, the Supreme Court of New Jersey went on to establish parameters for a final remedy to be applied by the State Tax Court in further proceedings. The remedy crafted by the court below would authorize refunds to petitioners only if the New Jersey Legislature failed to reimburse the State Spill Fund—the recipient of the taxes paid by petitioners under the Spill Act—for all preempted expenditures made by the Spill Fund within six months of a final accounting of those preempted expenditures. Dissatisfied with the decisions of the New Jersey Supreme Court as to severability and remedy, petitioners are seeking immediate and interlocutory mandamus review in this Court instead of waiting for a final judgment to be entered from which appellate review would be available in the normal course. As a result of the filing of this petition for a writ of mandamus, the proceedings as to remedy before the Tax Court of New Jersey have been stayed

pending resolution of the petition. (Respondent's appendix ("R. App.") at 1a).

New Jersey's Spill Act, which remains a focus of this litigation, imposes a tax on major petroleum and chemical facilities to generate revenues to be credited to the Spill Fund for use in financing the prevention and cleanup of hazardous discharges within the state. *N.J.S.A.* 58:10-23.11f, g, h. The Spill Act took effect in 1977, more than three full years before Congress addressed similar cleanup and funding issues in CERCLA. As adopted, the Spill Act authorized Spill Fund expenditures for several purposes: 1) to finance governmental cleanup of hazardous waste, including oilspills; 2) to reimburse innocent third parties for cleanup costs; 3) to compensate innocent third parties for damage resulting from oilspills or other discharges of hazardous wastes; 4) to pay personnel and equipment costs; 5) to administer the Spill Fund; and 6) to conduct research.

In December of 1980, CERCLA took effect. In that legislation Congress imposed a tax on certain petroleum and chemical products to be credited along with appropriations from general revenues to a trust account known as "Superfund." These moneys are available to finance federal cleanups of hazardous waste sites, although oilspills are beyond the statutory coverage, as is a mandatory state share of at least 10% of remedial costs. 42 *U.S.C.* §§ 9601, 9604, 9611. Superfund financing for cleanups is further limited to those purposes designated by the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("USEPA") in the National Contingency Plan ("NCP"), which includes the National Priority List ("NPL"), a compilation of the

worst sites nationwide. 42 *U.S.C.* §§ 9604, 9605, 9611; 40 *C.F.R.* § 300.1 *et seq.* In addition, nongovernmental parties are ineligible to receive monetary awards from Superfund for damage caused by releases of hazardous substances. 42 *U.S.C.* §§ 9611, 9612. As even a quick comparison of CERCLA and Spill Fund's authorized uses shows, there are areas where state coverage exceeds that available from Superfund as well as areas of overlap.

Included by Congress in CERCLA was § 114(c) (42 *U.S.C.* § 9614(c)), the primary focus of this litigation. Section 114(c) was a preemption clause which stated in pertinent part that, "Except as provided in this chapter, no person may be required to contribute to any fund, the purpose of which is to pay compensation for claims for any costs of response or damages or claims which may be compensated under this subchapter." Congress removed this preemption clause from the statute in the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act ("SARA"), *P.L.* 99-499, signed into law by the President on October 17, 1986. Based on the original § 114(c), however, petitioners instituted litigation in the Tax Court of New Jersey seeking the total preemption of the New Jersey Spill Tax and refunds of all of the taxes they had paid into the Spill Fund since the effective date of CERCLA. After each of three successive New Jersey courts upheld the Spill Tax, 4 *N.J. Tax* 294 (1982); 190 *N.J. Super.* 131, 462 *A.2d* 193 (App. Div. 1983), 97 *N.J.* 526, 481 *A.2d* 271 (1985), petitioners sought and obtained review from this Court.

This Court held that § 114(c) of CERCLA preempted in part the New Jersey Spill Act. *Exxon Corp. v. Hunt*,

475 *U.S.* at 358. The issues for determination addressed by the Court were the meaning and scope of CERCLA's preemption clause, and the preemptive impact of that statutory construction on the New Jersey Spill Fund. 475 *U.S.* at 363-364. After recognizing that § 114(c) was "not a model of legislative draftsmanship," 475 *U.S.* at 363, the Court concluded that the meaning of the provision could be ascertained only by reference to the remainder of CERCLA. *Ibid.* In scrutinizing the balance of the statute, the Court's primary focus was on categories of expenditures—those categories covered by CERCLA for which compensation from Superfund was available.

After analyzing CERCLA, this Court concluded that the NCP provided the criteria to determine "what expenses, at which sites, will be eligible for Superfund money." 475 *U.S.* at 374-375. As noted by the Court, the NCP specified that removal actions, or immediate cleanups, would be financed by Superfund only in emergency situations. 40 *C.F.R.* § 300.65. Remedial actions consistent with permanent remedies would be financed only for sites nominated by USEPA to the NPL, the list of the worst sites nationwide. 40 *C.F.R.* § 300.68(a). The Court thus used these regulatory parameters adopted by USEPA pursuant to CERCLA to define the categories of cleanup expenses "which may be compensated" by Superfund, and which—according to the Court's interpretation of § 114(c)—could not properly be duplicated as categories of expenditures from special state funds. 475 *U.S.* at 376. Even these parameters were not all-inclusive as to the scope of preemption, however, because the Court found that the state share of 10% or more of remedial costs

mandated by CERCLA as a prerequisite for Superfund action were not costs that could be compensated by Superfund. Consequently, federal preemption under § 114(c) did not extend to state fund financing of the state share of remedial costs.

The Court then applied this analysis to the Spill Act, concluding that the purposes of the state enactment were preempted only to the extent that they permitted “*expenditures*” beyond the state share “for remedial costs for sites on the National Priority List, or for removal costs that are eligible for Superfund compensation under the terms of the NCP. . . .” 475 *U.S.* at 376 (emphasis added). After so defining the scope of § 114(c) and its impact on the Spill Act, the Court stated that it was leaving to the New Jersey Supreme Court on remand “the state-law question whether, or to what extent, the non-preempted provisions of the statute are severable from the preempted provisions.” *Ibid.* There was no mention in the Court’s opinion of awarding tax refunds to petitioners. Following release of the opinion, this Court issued a mandate remanding the cause to the Supreme Court of New Jersey for “such proceedings . . . in conformity with the judgment of this Court. . . .” (Petitioners’ Appendix (“Pet. App.”) at 62a to 63a).

After receiving this mandate, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in turn remanded the case to the Tax Court “to develop a record and make such recommended findings and calculations as may be determined to be necessary to implement the mandate of the Supreme Court.” Jurisdiction, however, was otherwise retained. (Pet. App. 61a). On October 24, 1986, the Tax Court submitted its

recommendations pursuant to remand. (Pet. App. 27a to 61a). The recommendations addressed several key legal questions: prospective application of this Court's judgment (an issue raised on remand by the state); severability; the extent of refunds, if any; and the applicability of the State Tax Uniform Procedure Law, *N.J.S.A.* 54:14-14, to petitioners' demands for refunds. (Pet. App. 32a). Since all of these issues would have a significant impact on the calculation of preempted expenditures made by the Spill Fund, all parties agreed to submit them to the Tax Court for decision prior to undertaking an accounting. (Pet. App. 32a).

As to prospectivity, the Tax Court recommended that the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States be applied retroactively to the dates of the adoption of the NCP and the NPL—the regulatory “yardstick” established by this Court to determine those categories of expenditures that “may be compensated” by Superfund. The Tax Court also found as a matter of state law that the preempted purposes of the Spill Act were severable from the remainder of the statute. Specifically, the Tax Court concluded that the non-preempted purposes were identifiable and were “in no way dependent on the excised portions.” (Pet. App. 51a). It further recommended that any procedural deficiencies in petitioners' claims for refunds not bar the claims. The Tax Court also suggested that, following an accounting to determine all preempted expenditures made by the Spill Fund, the New Jersey Legislature should be given a reasonable period of time in which to reimburse the Fund for the improper expenditures. If, following such reimbursement, the amount of

money in the Spill Fund exceeded the statutory cap, the Tax Court recommended that the excess moneys be paid to petitioners. Should such reimbursement not be forthcoming from the Legislature, however, the Tax Court recommended that refunds be awarded to petitioners totalling the amount of preempted expenditures, with each petitioner to get a percentage reflecting its proportionate contribution to the total tax collected. (Pet. App. 59a to 60a).

Following receipt of these recommendations, the Supreme Court of New Jersey gave each side an opportunity to file exceptions. The court subsequently heard oral argument in the matter and, on December 2, 1987, issued its decision reviewing the Tax Court recommendations.

The Supreme Court of New Jersey approved and amplified the recommendations of the Tax Court, with some slight modifications. (Pet. App. 1a to 26a). As the basic premise of its opinion, the Supreme Court of New Jersey fully accepted this Court's determination that "the tax levied by the Spill Act was imposed for certain purposes that were preempted by CERCLA, as well as for other purposes not preempted by CERCLA." (Pet. App. 2a). The New Jersey Supreme Court also recognized that, "the Spill Act was preempted by § 114(c) of CERCLA to the extent that the Act authorized expenditures, beyond the mandatory state share, 'for remedial costs for sites on the National Priority List, or for removal costs that are eligible for Superfund compensation under the terms of the NCP.' " (Pet. App. 7a, quoting *Exxon Corp. v. Hunt*, 475 U.S. at 376). Indeed, the opinion below demonstrates that the New Jersey Supreme Court examined this Court's opinion carefully, quoted from it liberally, and viewed the

entire remand squarely in light of the conclusions reached by this Court. *See e.g.*, Pet. App. 2a to 7a.

The first issue addressed by the court below was severability:

In this unusual setting, the inquiry is whether the Legislature would have intended the non-preempted portions of the Spill Act, including the tax rate, to remain in effect notwithstanding the determination that significant statutory purposes were preempted by CERCLA *for a limited period*. [Pet. App. 8a, emphasis in original.]

After posing this question, the court went on to analyze the Spill Act and concluded that severability was warranted as “manifestly consistent with the legislative intent.” (Pet. App. 12a). The court further found that the Spill Act “makes sense” with or without the preempted purposes, and thus stands as a matter of state law despite the portions excised by this Court in *Exxon Corp. v. Hunt*, 475 U.S. at 374-376. (Pet. App. 7a to 12a). In reaching this conclusion, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected petitioners’ claims that severability was inappropriate because all of the statutory objectives had been financed by the same tax rate. (Pet. App. at 8a to 11a).


The New Jersey Supreme Court next addressed the period and scope of preemption. Like the Tax Court, it rejected the state’s prospectivity argument, endorsing instead the Tax Court’s recommendation that the adoption of the NCP and NPL marked the critical dates on which preemption should be deemed to commence. (Pet. App. 15a). This finding was based explicitly upon this Court’s determination that the NCP and NPL furnished the “ap-

propriate test” for determining preemption. (Pet. App. 17a to 18a, quoting 475 *U.S.* at 374). Next, the New Jersey Supreme Court established October 17, 1986—the date SARA was enacted and § 114(c) of CERCLA was repealed—as the end date of preemption, rejecting the state’s argument that the proper deadline was September 30, 1985, the date on which the taxing authorization under CERCLA expired. 42 *U.S.C.* § 9653 (1985) (Pet. App. 18a). The court noted for bookkeeping and accounting purposes that expenditures would be preempted only if the commitment of Spill Fund money was made subsequent to the promulgation of the NCP or NPL. After establishing these parameters, the court remanded the case once again to the Tax Court for an accounting to determine the exact amount of Spill Fund expenditures preempted by CERCLA. (Pet. App. 18a to 19a).

As to remedy, the court endorsed most of the Tax Court’s recommendations as responsive to the peculiar circumstances of this case where the Spill Tax was only partially invalidated, and even that partial invalidation was only for a limited time. (Pet. App. 20a). After analyzing the projected needs of the Spill Fund for non-preempted uses, recent legislative amendments to the Spill Act increasing the Fund’s tax base, and the congressional repeal of § 114(c), the court concluded that, “In our view, reimbursement of the Spill Fund from non-Spill Act revenues vindicates the Spill Fund’s payment of preempted expenses in a manner most consistent with the objectives of Congress and the Legislature.” (Pet. App. 25a). However, if the Legislature does not reimburse the Spill Fund within six months of a final accounting, petitioners are

entitled to *pro rata* refunds of the preempted expenditures. (Pet. App. 25a to 26a). Since the New Jersey Legislature had repealed the cap limitation provided in the original Spill Act, the court found the Tax Court's ruling on that point to be no longer appropriate. (Pet. App. 26a). The New Jersey Supreme Court then remanded the case back to the Tax Court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. (*Ibid.*). It did not retain jurisdiction.

Despite the availability of appeal at the conclusion of the remand, and despite the adherence by the Supreme Court of New Jersey to the mandate of this Court, petitioners are seeking interlocutory review by requesting the issuance of an extraordinary writ of mandamus to correct alleged errors made below. Since there is no final judgment and since none of the exceptional circumstances required by *Sup.Ct.R.* 26 for the issuance of a writ of mandamus are present here, respondents submit that the writ must be denied.



REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

1. **Mandamus Relief Is Unavailable Here Because The Review Sought Is Interlocutory In Nature And Thus Inconsistent With The Final Judgment Rule.**

It is a truism that the writ of mandamus may not be used as a substitute for appeal. *Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n*, 319 U.S. 21, 25-31 (1943). Normally, a final judgment is a necessary prerequisite to appellate review of state court judgments in this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Were interlocutory review of nonappealable orders to be

granted freely under the guise of mandamus, such action would undermine the strong congressional and judicial policies against piecemeal litigation and in favor of limiting appellate jurisdiction to final judgments. *Ibid.* See generally, *Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n*, *supra*, 319 U.S. at 30; *Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc.*, 449 U.S. 33, 34-36 (1980).

Where nonfinal judgments are subject to appeal in the normal course of judicial proceedings, mandamus ordinarily will not be granted. *Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n*, *supra*, 319 U.S. at 28-30. *Will v. United States*, 389 U.S. 90, 96-97 (1967). Moreover, inconvenience to the parties resulting from enforcement of the final judgment rule will not justify the issuance of a writ of mandamus. In *Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n*, for example, the Court held that mandamus was unavailable to alleviate the inconvenience of a party who would have to proceed to trial prior to final resolution of an important legal issue. 319 U.S. at 30. See also *Ex parte State of Texas*, 315 U.S. 8, 13-14 (1942), where the Court denied a petition for a writ of mandamus to correct an alleged misapplication of its mandate on remand despite recognizing that "petitioners were naturally eager for a prompt correction of the decision of [the court below], even though it was not final, without waiting for this rate controversy, already eight years old, again to wind its measured way through the Texas courts and then to be brought here. . . ." Eagerness for a quick decision from this Court to avoid inconvenience thus simply cannot justify deviation from the final judgment rule. These principles require the dismissal of petitioners' attempt to obtain interlocutory review of a decidedly nonfinal order.

There is no final judgment before this Court. The December 2, 1987 decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court which is the subject of this petition remanded the case to the Tax Court for an accounting of preempted expenditures. Such an accounting will be complex, and will require the exercise of judgment by the Tax Court. First, many factual determinations must be made, using the rulings of the New Jersey Supreme Court as to the scope and duration of partial preemption as guidelines. For example, the Tax Court will have to establish the dates on which tax moneys were committed for preempted purposes at particular sites prior to ascertaining the total amount of improper expenditures. In addition, pursuant to the explicit direction of the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Tax Court must also evaluate the eligibility of removal actions for Superfund coverage whenever the record reflects that USEPA had not previously made such a determination. (Pet. App. 19a, n.4). Numerous other factual and legal issues may arise as the parties and the Tax Court analyze millions of dollars of expenditures made by the Spill Fund at more than 100 sites during the period of preemption. Where the proceedings yet to be conducted are so significant, and are far from being simply ministerial in nature, review from this Court is not available until a final judgment is entered. *See generally, Minnick v. California Dept. of Corrections*, 452 U.S. 105, 120-125 (1981); *Republic Natural Gas v. Oklahoma*, 334 U.S. 62, 67-72 (1948); *California National Bank v. Stateler*, 171 U.S. 477 (1898). Once the accounting is completed and a final judgment entered, however, appellate review will be available in the normal course. *N.J. Court Rules, R. 2:2-3(1)*; 28 U.S.C. § 1257(c). At that time petitioners will be able

to raise the issues they are pursuing here as well as any other questions that may arise in the course of the accounting.

The principles of comity and federalism also support restraint by this Court until the state judicial processes have been concluded in a final judgment. See generally the discussion of these principles in *Lemon v. Kurtzman*, 411 U.S. 192, 208 (1973), citing *Younger v. Harris*, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

Petitioners have simply failed to present any compelling reasons to support deviation from the final judgment rule. No irreparable harm absent immediate and interlocutory intervention by this Court has been alleged; nor could it be since the relief requested is monetary in nature, namely a tax refund. Indeed, no damage of any significance would result to petitioners if they are denied mandamus review and are required to pursue their claims on appeal after the entry of a final judgment. Compare, *DeBeers Consolidated Mines, Limited v. United States*, 325 U.S. 212 (1945), where an extraordinary writ was issued to set aside a sequestration order, on the ground that damage done during the pendency of the order could not be repaired on appeal from a final judgment. Absent any such compelling circumstances, interlocutory review is not justified. This Court must consequently reject petitioners' attempt to use mandamus as a substitute for the appellate processes that will be available upon the entry of a final judgment.

**2. The Absence Of Exceptional Circumstances
Requires The Court To Deny The Petition
For A Writ Of Mandamus.**

This Court has made it clear that, "The remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary circumstances." *Kerr v. United States District Court*, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976). Indeed, in *Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc.*, *supra*, 449 U.S. at 36, the Court noted that a long line of its precedents had answered the question as to the availability of mandamus with the refrain, "What, never? Well hardly ever!" The Court's own rules echo the limited availability of mandamus: "The issuance by the Court of any extraordinary writ authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) is not a matter of right, but of discretion sparingly exercised." *Sup.Ct.R.* 26. To qualify for the issuance of a writ, petitioners must demonstrate that "the writ will be in aid of the Court's appellate jurisdiction, that there are present exceptional circumstances warranting the exercise of the Court's discretionary powers, and that adequate relief cannot be had in any other form or from any other court." *Ibid.*

There is nothing "extraordinary" about the New Jersey Supreme Court's exercising the discretion committed to it by this Court in the remand proceedings. Indeed, such a result was contemplated—explicitly as to severability and implicitly as to refunds—in this Court's opinion in *Exxon Corp. v. Hunt*, 475 U.S. at 358 to 377. That the court below has now exercised that discretion to petitioners' dissatisfaction is no justification for granting the extraordinary writ of mandamus. *See generally, Ex parte State of Texas*, *supra*, 315 U.S. at 11-14; *Roche v.*

Evaporated Milk Ass'n, supra, 319 U.S. at 25-31; *Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co.*, 437 U.S. 655, 663-667 (1978).

It is useful to compare the situation here to the truly extraordinary circumstances present in the cases cited by petitioners where the lower courts did the "inconceivable": that is, took action in clear and unmistakable derogation of a mandate of this Court. *General Atomic Co. v. Felter*, 436 U.S. 493 (1978) (where this Court held that a party had a federal right to pursue arbitration, mandamus would lie to correct state court injunction on remand curtailing party's federal arbitration rights); *Deen v. Hickman*, 358 U.S. 57 (1958) (where this Court had sustained finding of negligence, mandamus would lie to prevent lower court from reopening the issue); *Bucolo v. Adkins*, 424 U.S. 641 (1976) (where this Court found that the materials used to support an obscenity conviction were not obscene, mandamus would lie to prevent lower courts from conducting any further proceedings against defendants regarding violation of the state's obscenity statute). These precedents cannot assist petitioners because what occurred here was not only "conceivable," but anticipated—the exercises of discretion made below were contemplated by this Court in its opinion and mandate. Under these circumstances, there is nothing "extraordinary" to justify issuance of a writ of mandamus.

Moreover, a corollary to the "exceptional circumstances" doctrine is that petitioners must demonstrate that their right to mandamus is "clear and indisputable." *Will v. United States, supra*, 389 at 96; *Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., supra*, 449 U.S. at 35-36. Petitioners have not made such a showing here, and it is hard

to see how they could given the circumstances of this case. First, this Court remanded the issue of severability to the New Jersey Supreme Court, and explicitly recognized that severability was an issue of *state law*. 475 *U.S.* at 376. Severability was thus committed to the sound discretion of the court below. Next, this Court left open the issue of remedy, thereby submitting it as well to the sound discretion of the New Jersey Supreme Court. Since, “[w]here a matter is committed to discretion, it cannot be said that a litigant’s right to a particular result is ‘clear and indisputable,’ *Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc.*, *supra*, 449 *U.S.* at 36, mandamus is unavailable to review the interlocutory exercises of discretion made below. *See also, Will v. Calvert Fire Inc. Co.*, *supra*, 437 *U.S.* at 665-666 (1978).

3. Mandamus Is Unwarranted Because the Determinations on Remand of the Supreme Court of New Jersey are Completely Consistent With the Mandate of this Court.

The first issue addressed on remand by the New Jersey Supreme Court was the issue of severability. (Pet. App. 7a to 13a). This Court not only directed the New Jersey Supreme Court to determine whether the preempted purposes could be severed from the remainder of the Spill Act, but also recognized that the issue was purely one of *state law*. 475 *U.S.* at 376. The fact that severability is a state law issue defeats petitioners’ claim to mandamus relief on this point for, under *Sup.Ct.R.* 26, the writ of mandamus must be in aid of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, 28 *U.S.C.* § 1257, and a state law is-

sue is obviously not within that jurisdiction.* For the same reason, a conclusion on a state law issue cannot furnish the extraordinary grounds necessary for a writ of mandamus to issue. *See Ex parte State of Texas, supra*, 315 U.S. at 14.

Petitioners fare no better in arguing that the New Jersey Court's treatment of the issue of remedy justifies a writ of mandamus because that issue was left open by this Court. On remand, any matter left undecided by this Court may be considered and determined by the court below. *In Re Sanford Fork and Tool Co.*, 160 U.S. 247 (1895). Moreover, the decision of a lower court on remand as to issues left open by this Court's mandate can be reviewed only by a new appeal, and not through the interlocutory and extraordinary writ of mandamus. *Ibid.*; *Perkins v. Standard Oil Company of California*, 399 U.S. 222 (1970); *Sprague v. Ticonic Nat. Bank*, 307 U.S. 161 (1939). As the Court stated in *Ex parte Union Steamboat Co.*, 178 U.S. 317 (1900), "The inferior court is justified in considering and deciding any question left open by the mandate and opinion of this court, and its decision upon such matter can only be reviewed upon a new appeal to the proper court. . . ." These precedents compel the dismissal of the instant petition.

Even beyond application of these general principles, mandamus is unwarranted here because the remedial pa-

* Petitioners strain to find a federal question lurking in the issue of severability. That position is foreclosed by decisions of this Court. *Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations*, 267 U.S. 552, 562 (1925). *See also, Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission*, 429 U.S. 318, 337 n.15 (1977).

rameters established by the Supreme Court of New Jersey were based upon and derived from the judgment of this Court in *Exxon Corp. v. Hunt*. The very starting point of analysis used by the court below was the determination by this Court that CERCLA partially preempted the uses to which the entire Spill Act Tax could be put. Despite Exxon's protestations to the contrary, the ruling did not require invalidation of the Spill Fund Tax. While we agree with petitioners that this Court held that the actual expenditures made by the Spill Fund were irrelevant for the purpose of statutory construction—that is, deciding what § 114(e) meant—it does not follow from this conclusion that expenditures are irrelevant for the purpose of remedy. Nothing in the opinion of this Court supports petitioners' position in this regard. In fact, the finding of partial preemption, tailored as it was to sites on the NPL and to emergency response actions covered by the NCP, actually invites concentration on preempted expenditures as the most reasonable and practical way to establish an equitable remedy. The court below thus reasonably decided that the monetary amount of any remedy should be equal to the amount of expenditures actually made for preempted uses. Such an approach is completely consistent with this Court's finding of partial preemption, and also flows from the decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey that the non-preempted uses of the Spill Act were sufficient to support the original tax rate. While petitioners claim that this Court's decision requires a remedy amounting to the refund to them of all of the taxes they paid during the period of partial preemption, there is no support in this Court's opinion for their assertion. Indeed, the very remand of the severability issue

to the New Jersey Supreme Court without any mention of remedy completely undermines petitioners' argument.

Petitioners assert that the entire tax must fall because it contains a single tax rate which cannot be severed. Had this been this Court's view, presumably it would have said so, thereby concluding the matter without the necessity of a remand. Plainly, the Court's holding of partial preemption, focusing on expenditures for preempted purposes rather than upon tax collections, amply justifies looking beyond the tax rate to expenditures by the Spill Fund. If petitioners were correct, no taxing act found partially invalid and containing a single tax rate could be severed.

As to the period of preemption, the Supreme Court of New Jersey relied upon this Court's ruling that the proper test of Superfund eligibility was the NCP, including the NPL. It consequently used the promulgation dates of those regulations as the starting dates for calculating all preempted expenditures. Certainly, this approach is consistent with this Court's opinion and represents a reasonable and practical accommodation to the regulatory gap caused by USEPA's failure to adopt the NCP and NPL in the timely manner directed by Congress. *See*, 42 U.S.C. § 9605. Petitioners have no quarrel with the end date of preemption employed below—October 17, 1986, when SARA took effect and repealed the preemption clause.

Finally, the court below held that once the preempted expenditures were calculated, petitioners were not immediately and automatically entitled to refunds totalling that amount. Rather, given the highly unusual circumstances of this case of partial preemption, the court be-

low gave the New Jersey Legislature six months from the date of final accounting to reimburse the Spill Fund out of general revenues or some other appropriate source for all expenditures made in violation of CERCLA's preemption clause. Only if reimbursement is not made within the stipulated period will petitioners be entitled to *pro rata* refunds totalling the amount of preempted expenditures.

It is this holding that petitioners simply refuse to accept. In response, they argue that, from the beginning, the primary focus of this litigation has been tax refunds. Such an assertion is disingenuous, however, for the *only* focus of this litigation from its inception through the opinion and mandate of this Court was statutory construction: what § 114(c) of CERCLA meant and how that provision affected the New Jersey Spill Act. Only after this Court answered these pivotal questions of statutory interpretation and remanded the matter to the Supreme Court of New Jersey did the issue of tax refunds become a serious judicial concern. And, since this Court left open the question of ultimate remedy, the court below properly addressed and decided it on remand. As noted earlier, mandamus does not lie to review an issue left open by this Court. *In Re Sanford Fork and Tool Co.*, *supra*, 160 U.S. at 247; *Ex parte Union Steamboat Co.*, *supra*, 178 U.S. at 317.

Furthermore, the remedy devised by the Supreme Court of New Jersey takes full account of the partial preemption found by this Court and redresses any injury caused by the improper expenditure of Spill Fund moneys. As the Court noted in *Lemon v. Kurtzman*, *supra*, 411 U.S. at 200, "In shaping equity decrees, the trial court

is vested with broad discretionary power; appellate review is correspondingly narrow. . . . Moreover, in constitutional adjudication as elsewhere, equitable remedies are a special blend of what is necessary, what is fair and what is workable." (Citations and footnotes omitted). Although petitioners have argued that CERCLA removes the power of the court below to shape an equitable decree responsive to the statutory violation in issue, to public need, and to legislative intent, it is clear that such a major departure from the long tradition of equity practice should not be implied. See *Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo*, 456 U.S. 305, 311-320 (1982); *Hecht Co. v. Bowles*, 321 U.S. 321, 330 (1944). Petitioners' reliance on *T.V.A. v. Hill*, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), to defeat the traditional equitable discretion of the court below is unavailing. For it was the nature of the statute in issue in *Hill* which unequivocally barred construction projects in critical habitats that curtailed the Court's discretion regarding progress of the project when a critical habitat was discovered. Here, contrariwise, there is nothing in the history or language of CERCLA that similarly curtails the traditional equity powers of a court to shape relief following a finding of partial preemption. There is absolutely no language in the now repealed § 114(c), for example, that requires or even suggests that tax refunds be given to petitioners if partial preemption is found. Under such circumstances, the court below was empowered to do exactly what it did: use its equitable discretion to formulate a remedy responsive both to the constitutional violation in issue and to the highly unusual circumstances of this case. Its resolution of the many competing interests at stake was both reasonable and appropriate.

Finally, despite petitioners' contentions to the contrary, neither the decision below nor the actions of state officials in administering the Spill Act "flout federal law." Rather, both the Supreme Court of New Jersey and state officials admirably came to terms with the intricacies and complexities of two different but partially overlapping statutory schemes, an inartfully drawn preemption clause, and an eventual holding from this Court of partial preemption. As far as the state executive officials are concerned, they were faced for several years with an existing state statute, the questionable impact of CERCLA on that statute, and a series of state court decisions upholding the Spill Fund Tax. Given these circumstances, they proceeded with reasonable caution and some reasonable uncertainty to administer the Spill Fund under the cloud of possible preemption. This process, detailed in the affidavit of Robert Hunt, former Administrator of the Spill Fund (submitted to the Tax Court and reprinted at R. App. 3a to 9a), was anything but easy, and reflects an intense desire to comply with federal law so as to minimize any risk to the Spill Fund.* As to the

* Petitioners' contention that the majority of expenditures from the Spill Fund both before and after this Court's decision were for preempted purposes is simply wrong. See generally the affidavits of Robert Hunt (R. App. 3a to 9a) and David Mack (R. App. 10a to 16a). Petitioners rely for this assertion upon their own interpretations of information provided by the Spill Fund. The New Jersey Tax Court on remand noted the unreliability of these interpretations when it stated that, "It further appears that plaintiffs have not thoroughly analyzed nor utilized all of the information supplied on which they rely. By way of example, it appears that the figures recited for the projects targeted by plaintiffs do not necessarily represent what plaintiffs imply . . . The figures represent the total amounts spent at any site which has ever been included on the NPL including money

Supreme Court of New Jersey, it crafted a remedy designed to give full effect to this Court's holding of partial preemption, while still recognizing the needs of the public and the intents of Congress and the New Jersey Legislature. Federal law undoubtedly was vindicated. Mandamus is consequently unavailable.

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CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny the instant petition for a writ of mandamus.

Respectfully submitted,

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March 7, 1988

(Continued from previous page)

spent prior to December 1980 (effective date of CERCLA) and certainly prior to the adoption of the revised NPL" (Pet. App. 45a). Only a complete accounting on remand will provide the facts necessary to analyze and evaluate petitioners' claims. Their contentions are thus unworthy of consideration at this time, and emphasize the importance of requiring a final judgment before undertaking appellate review.

APPENDIX



APPENDIX A

**SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
(SEAL)**

John F. Evers, J.S.C. T/A

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Re: Exxon Corporation v. Hunt

Dear Counsel:

This will confirm the fact that the conference which was scheduled for January 13, 1988 has been adjourned without date. It is my understanding that plaintiffs have filed an appeal with the United States Supreme Court from the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court. Pending the outcome of that appeal this court will take no further action concerning this matter. However it would

2a

be appreciated if you would keep me advised of the status of the pending appeal.

Very truly yours,

/s/ John F. Evers
JOHN F. EVERS, J.S.C.

JFE/ccf

APPENDIX B

W. CARY EDWARDS
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TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY
 ON REMAND FROM THE
 SUPREME COURT OF
 NEW JERSEY
 DOCKET NO. A-66
 September Term 1984

EXXON CORPORATION, <i>et al.</i> ,)	
)	
Plaintiffs,)	
)	
v.)	Civil Action
)	
ROBERT HUNT,)	AFFIDAVIT OF
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE)	ROBERT E. HUNT
NEW JERSEY SPILL)	
COMPENSATION FUND, <i>et al.</i> ,)	
)	
Defendants.)	
STATE OF NEW JERSEY)	
)	ss
COUNTY OF MERCER)	

ROBERT E. HUNT, of full age, being duly sworn
 according to law, upon his oath deposes and says:

1. From January 1978 until January 1986 I was the administrator and chief executive of the New Jersey Spill Compensation Fund. As administrator of the Fund, I was responsible for all of the expenditures paid out of the Fund. In this regard, I supervised a staff which assisted me in authorizing expenditures, reviewing, auditing, and approving individual invoices relating to cleanup actions; adjusting and settling damage claims against the Fund; and reviewing contract terms relating to cleanup agreements with outside contractors. In the course of these activities, I maintained records of all expenditures made by the Fund. I also was involved in New Jersey's applications for federal funds related to the cleanup of hazardous substances, both under the federal Superfund legislation and the earlier federal water pollution control legislation.

2. Upon the adoption of the Superfund Act in December 1980, I became concerned about the impact of the preemption language on the spending alternatives of the Spill Fund. In order to get judicial guidance on the meaning of the preemption language and, in turn, to give me guidance in regard to Spill Fund expenditures, the Attorney General of New Jersey filed a lawsuit in federal court in Washington, D.C., seeking a definitive interpretation of the preemption language. This lawsuit was eventually dismissed, and the Attorney General pursued the scope of the preemption issue in state court in an action brought by several petrochemical companies to invalidate the Fund on preemption grounds. Pending resolution of this state court action, *Exxon v. Hunt*, the Division of Taxation continued levying and collecting the Spill Fund

Tax, and I continued to authorize expenditures from the Fund.

3. In light of the preemption language in the statute and the pending litigation, however, I began to scrutinize Fund expenditures much more closely, particularly after April 1981 when the federal tax was first collected under CERCLA. Where federal funding under the Superfund Act appeared likely at a New Jersey site, it became my practice not to authorize expenditures from the Spill Fund. Where federal funding was unlikely, or where the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection informed me that emergency conditions existed and immediate cleanup action was necessary, I would authorize expenditures from the Spill Fund, as discussed in more detail below.

4. Decisions on appropriate expenditures were particularly hard to make after April 1981 and during the first four months of 1982 because the scope of the federal program had not been defined and Superfund financing decisions appeared to be made by EPA on a case by case basis. In fact, there was virtually no money available from Superfund during this time and no real guidance from USEPA as to what activities would eventually be funded. Although Congress had directed that the Superfund program be implemented through a revised National Contingency Plan ("NCP") to be adopted by June 1981, EPA never met this deadline and the NCP, revised pursuant to CERCLA, was not even published until July 1982. (EPA action in regard to the NCP was brought about, in part, by a lawsuit filed by New Jersey in which the State obtained an injunction compelling the Agency to adopt the

Plan.) Once published in July 1982, the NCP limited Superfund expenditures for remedial (complete long-term clean up) actions to sites on the National Priority List ("NPL") which was to be a compilation of the worst sites nationwide. However, EPA did not officially promulgate the NPL until September 1983, more than a year after the NCP was first published. This delay created further uncertainty for the Spill Fund because of the lack of a determination as to what sites and actions would be eligible for Superfund financing.

5. Due to this significant void in federal guidance, we in New Jersey felt that we had to be prepared to use the Spill Fund to address pressing State priorities even if we were risking the possibility of some conflict in regard to the preemption language contained in the Superfund Act. The bottom line was that we felt we had no real choice in the matter in many instances. Adding to the difficulties encountered, was the fact that on some occasions, when we asked EPA officials whether Superfund would provide financing for a New Jersey site, we were told that there was no money available at that time. At times, EPA simply did not reply to written requests for a decision on whether funding would be available. We did not know in these circumstances whether to spend Spill Fund monies or wait for a more definite response from EPA. On occasion it was unclear whether a particular cleanup action would ever be eligible for Superfund financing.

6. In order to have some basis on which to make funding decisions, I applied an informal, internal set of guidelines during the period from April 1981 until Sep-

tember 1984 when the New Jersey Supreme Court issued its decision in this matter. Expenditures were authorized (1) for emergency actions when Spill Fund staff had received at least a verbal response from EPA that funds would not be available in the reasonably foreseeable future; (2) for exploratory activities necessary to identify the existence and scope of a discharge problem and to establish justification of a request for Superfund financing; (3) for general maintenance such as monitoring, guard service, and security fences; and (4) for matching state funds when federal money was available under a federal program other than Superfund.

7. In April of 1982, Spill Fund spending decisions became somewhat easier because the New Jersey Tax Court held that expenditures out of the Spill Fund were appropriate except where Superfund financing was actually provided. Based on this decision, the Spill Fund had greater confidence about its right to spend Fund revenues to supplement the federal program, and to pick up the slack that was being left by EPA in regard to many New Jersey sites. The fact that Exxon appealed the Tax Court decision did continue to make us careful about spending decisions, however, because we knew refunds of tax revenues were being sought and we did not want to jeopardize Spill Fund moneys unnecessarily. Despite the Tax Court ruling, therefore, we continued to carefully monitor EPA's funding decisions and to focus Spill Fund expenditures in those areas described in the previous paragraph where EPA was not expected to provide financing, or was not expected to provide financing quickly enough to meet New Jersey's pressing needs.

8. The situation at the Chemical Control Corporation plant in Elizabeth provides an example where cleanup efforts began under the Spill Act before Superfund became effective in December 1980 but necessarily had to continue even after the CERCLA tax was first collected in April 1981, even though it was likely that Superfund financing might eventually be available for the site. In April 1979 NJDEP closed the plant after officials found thousands of unmarked barrels of chemicals stored on the property, many of them damaged and leaking. On April 22, 1980 the barrels caught fire and exploded, sending clouds of chemical smoke into the air. NJDEP began cleanup work in 1979 and continued until June 1981 when the bulk of the work was completed. Since that date work at the site has been mainly for maintenance. It would have been absurd for NJDEP to cease work at the site in April 1981 based on a speculative federal program, particularly in the face of proven danger, need to take immediate action and the availability of readily accessible money in the Spill Fund. By June 30, 1981, more than \$20 million had been spent by the Spill Fund for cleanup of Chemical Control. Many of the invoices for work done before April 1981 were paid after that date. It would be extremely difficult, if possible at all, to determine which expenditures were for work completed or contracted for before April 1981 but paid after that date.

9. Numerous other examples can be given for sites where significant amounts of Spill Fund moneys were spent for cleanup at a site which was eventually put on the NPL. Such pre NPL expenditures were justified because of the real and potential harm to the public and the environment posed by the unremediated discharges and the lack of federal funding. In these instances also it will

be very difficult to determine which invoices paid after a site was listed on the NPL were for work done before listing.

10. As the years progressed, the federal program became more defined through the adoption and actual implementation of the NCP and NPL. In addition, as the Tax Court decision was affirmed first by the Appellate Division and then by the New Jersey Supreme Court, we felt more confident about spending Spill Fund moneys for sites where federal compensation had not been provided. One area of spending that continued to trouble us even after the State Supreme Court decision, was where a site was on the NPL, but where EPA clearly indicated no federal funding was available, and none looked likely in the foreseeable future. In such circumstances, if the cleanup work in question was deemed essential to protect the people and environment of New Jersey, the Spill Fund would provide money to finance such work. I fully believed that such expenditures were consistent with the State court rulings which authorized the Spill Fund to spend for work not actually compensated by the federal Superfund. Again, where environment or population was in danger, I felt we had no other choice.

/s/ Robert E. Hunt
Robert E. Hunt

Sworn and Subscribed to
before me this 16th day
of July 1986

/s/ Hillary A. Peterson, Esq.

An attorney at law in the
State of New Jersey

APPENDIX C

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TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY
 ON REMAND FROM THE
 SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
 DOCKET NO. A-66 September
 Term 1984

EXXON CORPORATION, <i>et al.</i> ,)	
)	
Plaintiffs,)	
)	
v.)	Civil Action
)	
ROBERT HUNT,)	AFFIDAVIT OF
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE)	DAVID MACK
NEW JERSEY SPILL)	
COMPENSATION FUND, <i>et al.</i> ,)	
)	
Defendants.)	
STATE OF NEW JERSEY)	
)	ss:
COUNTY OF MERCER)	

DAVID MACK, of full age, being duly sworn accord-
 ing to law, deposes and says:

1. I am Acting Administrator of the New Jersey Spill Compensation Fund, and have held this position since February 1986. As Acting Administrator, I am responsible for general supervision of the Fund's activities. I served as Deputy Administrator of the Fund from December 1985 until I assumed the position of Acting Administrator. Prior to my employment at the Spill Fund, I was a regulatory officer in the Office of Regulatory Services of the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP). One of my responsibilities as a regulatory officer was to monitor the Spill Fund's activities. I also have been heavily involved in New Jersey's hazardous waste cleanup program since 1980, including involvement in negotiating contracts and cooperative agreements under the federal Superfund program between NJDEP and the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("USEPA"). I hold a bachelor's degree from Lehigh University (1974) and a J.D. from the New England School of Law (1978).

2. I was Acting Administrator of the Spill Fund when the decision of the United States Supreme Court in *Exxon v. Hunt* was issued on March 10, 1986. In light of the partial preemption decision, the Fund moved immediately to conform its expenditures to the requirements of the decision. This task has not been an easy one from an administrative point of view because the general holding of the Court does not answer the myriad questions relating to the practical application of the decision. Where certain expenditures are arguably preempted, however, we have decided not to authorize Spill Fund moneys to pay such costs. The Fund has thus established categories of

preempted costs (as further described in the remainder of this affidavit) and is proceeding to function with these categories severed from the remaining, clearly nonpreempted uses of the Fund.

3. Under the National Contingency Plan ("NCP") USEPA may draw upon Superfund dollars to finance emergency removal activities. USEPA presently makes determinations as to the eligibility of an emergency for such federally financed response on a case by case basis. Additionally, USEPA and NJDEP are negotiating a Memorandum of Understanding which would establish a protocol for determining when an emergency was eligible for a Superfund financed removal. Where USEPA rejects an emergency as ineligible for Superfund coverage, the Spill Fund will finance it as a nonpreempted expenditure. Until official USEPA rejections are received, NJDEP—in light of the Supreme Court decision—is now funding emergency removals from an appropriation made available by the Legislature for cleanup work at hazardous waste sites. This appropriation, known as the "capital account," from general revenues resulted from New Jersey's budget surplus of Fiscal Year 1985, amounted to \$150 million, and has no preemption restrictions whatsoever.

4. Where expenditures for emergency removal actions not specifically declared ineligible for Super Fund financing or for NPL sites beyond the State share had been approved by NJDEP but not paid as of March 10, 1986, we went ahead and paid them out of the Spill Fund in order to satisfy our obligations to vendors. Since March 10, 1986, NJDEP has been reimbursing the Spill Fund for those expenditures out of the capital account to accommo-

date the decision of the Supreme Court, and to be consistent with the spending guidelines outlined above.

5. As to sites on the National Priority List ("NPL"), we are restricting Spill Fund expenditures to the authorized State share of remedial costs which is 10% for most sites, and 50% for sites owned or operated by the State or its political subdivisions. Any other State expenditures at NPL sites are currently being drawn from the capital account discussed above.

6. The Spill Fund has taken the above actions even though we question whether they are strictly necessary under the Court's decision. As noted in the majority opinion of Justice Marshall, the federal taxing authority for Superfund expired on September 15, 1985. USEPA has since been unable to finance much needed cleanup work at NPL sites in New Jersey. Although the Spill Fund had advanced some money to USEPA for remedial actions at NPL sites to cover the shortfall in federal dollars, and in anticipation of eventual reimbursement from USEPA once Superfund was reauthorized by Congress, we have shifted such advance funding to the capital account pending a decision as to whether such expenditures are preempted. We have also shifted to the capital account expenditures for remedial and emergency-type actions at NPL sites where USEPA has declined to make funds available—such as the installation of water pipe lines to provide alternate water service to people whose wells have been contaminated. Although we question whether such expenditures are preempted, we will continue to finance these costs from non-Spill Fund sources until the issue is resolved.

7. The Spill Fund has continued to finance all categories of costs not preempted by the Supreme Court decision. These categories include the State Superfund share of 10% or more of remedial costs at NPL sites, remedial activities and related costs at sites not on the NPL, third-party damage claims, and the administrative costs of Spill Fund. Expenditures for all of these categories are expected to escalate sharply in the next few years as NJDEP implements a five-year plan for hazardous waste response activities in the State, and the Spill Fund expands its staff to improve its record of recoveries from responsible parties and its compensation of outstanding, backlogged third-party damage claims. The Spill Fund thus anticipates being able to use all of the current annual tax revenues for nonpreempted uses, and will even need the revenues from an increased tax rate if NJDEP's five-year cleanup goals are to be accomplished. For a detailed discussion of NJDEP's anticipated financing needs from the Spill Fund and other sources, see the affidavit of Michael F. Catania, Deputy Commissioner of NJDEP.

8. As Acting Administrator of the Spill Fund since the issuance of the *Exxon v. Hunt* decision by the Supreme Court, I am familiar with Exxon's requests for discovery from the Spill Fund. I have become concerned about these requests because Exxon essentially has asked for a superficial accounting of past expenditures which, in my opinion, does not reflect all of the factors relevant to a determination of preemption. For example, Exxon has asked for a list of expenditures at sites on the NPL from December 1980 to the present. This information was provided, but it should be noted that the costs listed include

expenditures contracted for a paid prior to listing on the NPL, expenditures contracted for prior to listing on NPL but paid after listing, administrative charges billed directly to the project account, costs later reimbursed by EPA for advanced funding, costs EPA declared to be ineligible for funding and costs which may be credited in the future against the State's mandated 10% share. Our records reveal the date on which invoices are paid, but not the date on which the work was contracted for or actually performed. If cleanup activities were performed under contract with a vendor prior to the listing of a site on the NPL, but paid after the listing, it would seem to me that the cost should not be viewed as a preempted one since it was incurred prior to the site becoming eligible for Superfund financing. To discover the date of performance, however, every invoice would have to be examined. Such an undertaking is staggering in terms of time and resources when 99 New Jersey sites—the number currently on the NPL—are involved. At *least* 1,800 invoices would have to be scrutinized. Indeed, the Spill Fund would have to hire either a contractor or new staff to perform this lengthy task. Additionally, these invoices would have to be scrutinized to determine whether non-preempted costs such as administrative costs had been included. Before undertaking such a detailed accounting, therefore, it would be vastly preferable from my point of view to have legal issues decided that possibly could avoid the need for the detailed accounting.

/s/ David C. Mack
DAVID MACK

Sworn and subscribed to before me
this 15 day of July, 1986.

/s/ Nancy B. Stiles
Attorney at Law
State of New Jersey

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

IN RE EXXON CORPORATION, THE BF GOODRICH COMPANY,
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION, MONSANTO COMPANY,
AND TENNECO RESINS, INC.,
Petitioners.

**On Petition For A Writ Of Mandamus
To The Supreme Court Of New Jersey**

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

No. 87-1296

IN RE EXXON CORPORATION, THE BF GOODRICH COMPANY,
UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION, MONSANTO COMPANY,
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**On Petition For A Writ Of Mandamus
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REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

Respondents acknowledge that the state court has denied petitioners a refund of preempted taxes, and principally argue that this Court should await further proceedings before considering whether the state court has acted in conformity with the mandate. This argument misstates the precedents governing compliance with the Court's mandate. Moreover, to the extent they respond to the substance of our argument, respondents fail to recognize that CERCLA prohibited the imposition of certain taxes, rather than expenditures, by the states.

1. We demonstrated in our petition (pages 7-8) that this Court has consistently held that mandamus is the appropriate remedy, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, to correct a lower court's violation of this Court's mandate.

Respondents virtually ignore the settled precedents supporting this proposition. Instead, they rely (Br. in Opp. 11-14) on cases addressing the entirely different question whether mandamus can be used to review an unappealable interlocutory order where no issue of compliance with an appellate mandate was presented.¹ Respondents also rely on cases holding that this Court does not have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 to review nonfinal judgments of state courts,² but this proposition is irrelevant to this Court's jurisdiction under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. See, e.g., *Deen v. Hickman*, 358 U.S. 57 (1958); *Bucolo v. Adkins*, 424 U.S. 641 (1976), in which this Court has used mandamus as a vehicle to correct a state court's violation of the mandate without requiring that the judgment be final within the meaning of Section 1257. In the one case cited by respondents that even arguably is on point, *Ex parte Texas*, 315 U.S. 8 (1942), the Court refused the writ because the lower court was in compliance with the mandate, not because the writ was unavailable.

No prudential concerns justify delay in correcting the New Jersey Supreme Court's violation of this Court's mandate. The further proceedings by the Tax Court contemplated by the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision, which will entail lengthy and ultimately irrelevant analysis of millions of dollars of expenditures (Br. in Opp. 13), are premised solely upon its erroneous view that this

¹ See *Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n*, 319 U.S. 21 (1943) (mandamus not available to correct district court order striking pleas in abatement in criminal case); *Allied Chemical Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc.*, 449 U.S. 33 (1980) (mandamus not available to review district court order granting new trial); *Will v. United States*, 389 U.S. 90 (1967) (mandamus not available to vacate pretrial order in criminal case). The Court in *Will* recognized that mandamus is appropriate "to confine a lower court to the terms of an appellate tribunal's mandate." *Id.* at 95-96.

² See *Minnick v. California Dep't of Corrections*, 452 U.S. 105 (1981); *Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma*, 334 U.S. 62 (1948).

Court's decision in *Exxon v. Hunt*, 475 U.S. 355 (1986), interpreted Section 114(c) of CERCLA as preempting expenditures, not taxes. Because "reversal of the State court on the federal issue would be preclusive of any further litigation" in the Tax Court, immediate review is warranted. *Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn*, 420 U.S. 469, 482-83 (1975). See also, *id.* at 479 ("[t]he federal issue is conclusive"); *id.* at 480 ("[t]he federal issue . . . will survive and require resolution regardless of the outcome of the future state-court proceedings").

Finally, respondents' argument that "exceptional circumstances" are necessary to justify granting mandamus to confine a lower court to this Court's mandate (Br. in Opp. 15-17) simply collapses to the merits—whether or not the New Jersey Supreme Court violated the mandate in *Exxon v. Hunt*. That violation provides the "exceptional circumstances" supporting issuance of the writ.

2. Our petition showed (pages 8-13) that the New Jersey Supreme Court violated the mandate, as well as the plain language of Section 114(c) of CERCLA, by looking to expenditures, rather than the tax itself. This led it to the further errors of delaying preemption for almost three years after Section 114(c) became effective and of relying on the subsequent repeal of Section 114(c), as well as equitable principles, to design a remedy that made the Spill Fund "whole" rather than refunding illegally collected taxes to petitioners.

Section 114(c) plainly prohibits the exaction of certain taxes: "[N]o person may be required to contribute to any fund, the purpose of which is to pay compensation. . . ." Thus, this Court characterized the issue in this case as whether Section 114(c) "forbids state taxation of the type the Spill Act imposes," 475 U.S. at 362, and it held that Section 114(c) prohibited the imposition of taxes motivated by improper purposes, *id.* at 375.

Because this Court found that the New Jersey tax was prompted, in part, by preempted purposes, its mandate

rested on the rationale that “state legislation is invalid ‘to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. . . .’” 475 U.S. at 376. Specifically “declin[ing] the dissent’s invitation” to uphold the tax “in its entirety because a substantial portion of its purposes are permissible,” this Court instead remanded for a determination “whether, or to what extent, the non-preempted provisions of the statute are severable from the preempted provisions.” *Id.*³

Rather than following this Court’s mandate and determining the extent to which the tax was invalidated by its preempted purposes, the state court focused on the wholly different question of whether the state had made improper expenditures from the Fund. In respondents’ own words,

“[t]he very starting point of analysis used by the court below was the determination by this Court that CERCLA partially preempted *the use* to which the entire Spill Act Tax would be put.” (Br. in Opp. 19, emphasis added).⁴

Respondents themselves reveal the errors in this approach by conceding in the very same paragraph of their argument “that the actual expenditures made by the Spill Fund were irrelevant for the purpose of statutory construction—that is, deciding what § 114(c) meant. . . .” (*Id.*)

³ New Jersey suggests that, because the question of severability is “a state law issue,” a petition for mandamus complaining of the New Jersey court’s actions on remand is inappropriate. (Br. in Opp. 17). However, the question of whether that court conformed to the mandate is indisputably a federal question. *See Ex parte Texas*, 315 U.S. at 13. The New Jersey court misunderstood the mandate when it failed to determine whether the New Jersey tax was severable into preempted and non-preempted components, and instead focused upon the expenditures made from the New Jersey Spill Fund.

⁴ *See also id.* at 2, 6, 10, 13, 21 (referring to preempted or improper expenditures or uses).

The error of focusing upon expenditures, rather than exaction of the tax, led to the further error of dating preemption from the promulgation of the NCP and NPL, which define the permissible expenditures that can be made from the CERCLA Superfund. Had the lower court understood that it was the tax itself that was preempted, it would have been compelled to rule that preemption became effective immediately upon the enactment of CERCLA and that petitioners' rights to refunds dated from the moment that they paid a preempted tax.

The New Jersey court's error in confusing expenditures and taxes also led it to design a remedy which seeks to make the Spill Fund "whole," rather than addressing the improper exactions that have been imposed upon petitioners. The Spill Fund was already more than "whole"—it had received a windfall in the form of tax monies from petitioners resulting from a revenue measure that was, at least in part, illicit. The Legislature's transfer of additional monies into the fund would in no sense correct the State's error in collecting the tax.⁵

Finally, the State's argument (Br. in Opp. 22) that the lower court had discretion to deny petitioners a refund ignores the plain command of Section 114(c) that "[n]o person may be required to contribute to any [proscribed] fund. . . ." Only a tax refund can provide the remedy required by the statute.

3. The decision below allows the State of New Jersey to collect and retain taxes that have been preempted by act of Congress. Absent corrective action by this Court, the State will thus have accepted and acted upon the very "open invitation . . . to flout federal law" which this

⁵ Respondents claim that this Court did not decide and therefore left open questions of remedy. (Br. in Opp. 18). It did not, however, leave to the lower court the discretion to design a remedy based upon a fundamental misconception regarding both Section 114(c) and this Court's mandate.

Court, in response to the dissent's urging, explicitly declined to issue. 475 U.S. at 376.

For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the petition, a writ of mandamus should issue.

Respectfully submitted,

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